"unexpected Russian military victory in Syria." Türkiye (Türkiye): what does Russia want in Syria? Inosmi about the Russian army in Syria

America would be better off accepting that Russia is a powerful and influential force. The United States finds itself at the epicenter of a major international catastrophe. Assad remains in power. Is Russia really becoming an alternative to America in the Middle East? All this is the new reality of the Middle East region...

Russia, always firm and adamant in supporting its allies and demonstrating itself as a reliable partner who at the same time does not impose itself, has been able to prove in recent years that it is the best choice for the Middle East region than the United States. In addition, it is also now completely clear that Assad remains in power in Syria.

As the final stage of the military conflict in Syria approaches and its transition to the stage of political settlement, American politicians increasingly have to reckon with the following reality: the whole world has truly undergone significant changes since the beginning of the civil conflict in Syria in 2011 to the present day.

Thanks to the Syrian conflict, what Israel and the United States perhaps least wanted happened: regional forces under Iranian control found themselves just a few kilometers from the border with Israel. And this, in turn, made direct military confrontation between Russia and the United States very likely. In addition, even a cursory glance at the current situation in Syria allows us to unequivocally state that the United States has not achieved its key goals in the Syrian conflict - namely, the removal of Bashar al-Assad from power. And it seems that they have already come to terms with this. The United States, having missed not only a military, but also a political victory in the conflict, having suffered heavy losses, again, both on the purely military and political fronts, must now do at least something to achieve the last possible victory here - victory at least on the humanitarian front.

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They must convince the population that, not in words, but in deeds, they want to save the local population from a humanitarian catastrophe. And in order to achieve this goal, Washington willy-nilly will have to cooperate with Moscow - a player who has undeniable influence on the regime of Bashar al-Assad, but is also ready to listen. And for this, the United States will need to officially recognize the role that Moscow now plays in the world: it is, first of all, a real and influential force in the international community, without which not a single major conflict can be resolved. But at the same time, this does not mean that she is an international gendarme. It would also be nice for the United States, at least in some special cases, to learn to cooperate with Moscow as an equal partner.

Stephen Cook recently said that Syria is another clear example of how the United States, facing one of the largest international tragedies, nevertheless did nothing to prevent this tragedy. Cook is also, of course, correct when he argues that the United States has not learned any lessons from its inaction in the conflicts that took place in the 1990s. However, he forgets that Russia, during the same period, learned precisely from the examples and mistakes of the United States. After the collapse of the USSR, Russia watched very carefully how the United States, while undoubtedly becoming a factor of power in the Middle East, at the same time pursued a rash and adventurous policy here. It is possible that this will be the most ambitious adventurism in the entire history of the 21st century.

And now Moscow appears on the scene as a powerful influential force, which local leaders have been looking for all this time - they were looking for it in order to work with this force, and not get involved in the next adventures. And any analysis that assumes that Putin, having come to Syria, will now either weaken his position here or completely discard Syria, like a child - a boring toy, will lead to nowhere. And when Russia intervened in the Syrian conflict for the first time in 2014, and used its own (armed) forces, it thereby conveyed an important message to the whole world, and above all to the West: it is no longer ready to stand on the sidelines and indifferently watch how Somewhere in the Middle East a new power vacuum and power vacuum is emerging. She is not ready, since this directly affects her interests. And throughout the years since Russia entered the Syrian scene and remains there, Putin has continually proven that in the 21st century Russia can be more than just the world's largest arms seller.

Russia, by standing firmly behind its allies in the region and proving itself to be a truly trustworthy partner, has seized its chance to emerge as a worthy alternative to the United States for Middle Eastern leaders. At the same time, it became completely clear that Bashar al-Assad remains in power, as well as the fact that the Kremlin also remains an ally of Syria.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.

Last week, the Russian military brought more than a hundred foreign journalists to Palmyra, including our team from CNN. This trip was intended to show the role of Moscow in the liberation ancient monument and object cultural heritage, and also tell a lot about the combat potential of the Russian army and the scope of its activities in Syria.

Transport this a large number of people in this war-torn country from the Russian air base in Latakia over a long distance to a place where fighting had recently taken place - this is a large-scale operation that requires enormous organizational efforts and security measures.

The convoy included five buses filled with journalists, at least eight armored vehicles with heavy machine guns and two combat vehicles. Two attack helicopters were constantly patrolling in the sky above the column. During the trip, which lasted more than six hours, the helicopters were changed several times, and we were able to see all their diversity, starting with the Mi-28 and Ka-52, and ending with the modernized Mi-35. Driving through the territory of Syria along its west coast, we saw several bases with Russian helicopters near Homs and in the Palmyra area.

At the end of 2015, Russia sent dozens of attack aircraft and fighter jets to Syria to carry out bombing attacks in support of the troops of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. But Moscow appears to have deployed several significant ground forces in different parts of Syria. There is no exact information about the number of Russian military personnel in this country, but during the trip it seemed to us that at least several thousand soldiers with modern weapons and infrastructure were concentrated there.

The Khmeimim base on the outskirts of Latakia is located on the coast in the northwest of the country. This is an active Syrian military airfield and a container-type town built by the Russians. The camp is large, modern and in excellent condition.

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During morning exercise, the Russian command allowed us to film some of the servicemen lifting weights, playing volleyball, basketball and boxing. A young lieutenant, who gave only his first name, Vladimir, said the servicemen are very well motivated.

“I’m happy to be serving my country here,” he said.

The professionalism of the military personnel and the impeccable condition of their military equipment show that the Russian armed forces have done great job since a massive modernization program was launched a few years ago. In addition to dozens of combat aircraft, Russia has numerous combat helicopters, tanks, armored personnel carriers and anti-aircraft missile systems in Syria.

But the biggest surprise for us was that in other places in Syria we also saw many Russian ground forces units. The army has established a brand new outpost near the ancient city of Palmyra. Officially, this is the base of sappers who, after the liberation of the city from ISIS, neutralized thousands of explosive devices in Palmyra itself and nearby villages.

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But along with engineering equipment, dozens of combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers could be seen at the base. This equipment may have been deployed there to protect sappers, but Russia has also deployed a modern Pantsir-S1 air defense system in the area, which can launch missiles at enemy aircraft and conduct anti-aircraft artillery fire on them.

The Russian military told CNN that its aircraft select and destroy targets independently, and the Syrian military provides them with only limited information. The official representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Igor Konashenkov, also says that Moscow has no influence on the choice of targets that hit the Syrian Air Force.

The United States says Russia is moving artillery to the embattled city of Aleppo, raising concerns that the truce will not hold. But the Russians do not confirm this information. If Assad takes control of the entire city of Aleppo, it will be an important victory.

As for the ceasefire in Aleppo, according to the Syrian state news agency SANA, it has been extended there by 48 hours. This statement was made on Monday by the commander of the country's armed forces.

While the exact extent of the Russian military presence in Syria is still unclear, what we saw while at the base suggests that there are more troops there, and they are much more modern than many people think. These soldiers are completely different from the army that is planning to leave Syria in the near future.

“None of the cruise missiles fired by the United States and its allies entered the zone of Russian air defenses protecting facilities in,” reads the ministry’s statement, which cites data from Russian bases located in Syria.

According to Daily Sabah, the commander of the regional military alliance that supports Bashar al-Assad said that among the locations hit by targeted coalition airstrikes was an airbase located west of Damascus near the Lebanese border called Al-Shirai.

Also hit were Masyaf, which is located about 170 km north of Damascus, army warehouses in the eastern part of the Qalamoun district northeast of the capital, the Kiswe district south of Damascus and an area in the Qasyoun hills near the capital.

According to Syrian media, the attack also targeted a research facility in Damascus, which, according to the Pentagon, was used for the development, production and testing of chemical and biological weapons.

James Mattis called the attack by the US, UK and France a one-off attack. According to him, the repetition of military action on Syrian territory will depend on Damascus, reports Russian Dialogue.

He also named missile strike“a strong message.”

“It will depend on whether Mr Assad decides to continue to use chemical weapons in the future. Now this is a one-shot strike, and I believe it is a very powerful message,” Mattis said.

According to the UK Ministry of Defence, four Tornado fighters were involved in the attack and fired StormShadow missiles. Meanwhile, the French Ministry of Defense released a video of Rafale combat aircraft flying into Syria.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, Washington and its allies fired more than a hundred cruise missiles and air-to-ground missiles. Currently, three victims are known. There are no Russians among them.

Authoritative American publication "Defense News" in a special issue "Outlook 2018" representing the opinions of world political and military leaders and authorities on the results of 2017 and the prospects for 2018 in military-political relations, also published the opinion of the director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (AST Center) Ruslan Pukhov “Moscow-based think tank director: Russia's unexpected military victory in Syria" ("Unexpected Russian military victory in Syria"). We offer the Russian text of the publication.

One of the main events of 2017 was the victory won by the Russian armed forces and the government of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. When Vladimir Putin unexpectedly and decisively intervened in the bloody Syrian civil war in September 2015, many voices in the West, starting with US President Barack Obama, were quite unanimous in predicting that Moscow would become bogged down in the conflict.

A little over two years later, it is already obvious to everyone that no “new Afghanistan” has happened in Syria for Putin. During the intervention, Russia almost completely fulfilled its main tasks in Syria. The military and political situation of the Bashar al-Assad regime, which seemed almost hopeless in the summer of 2015, has radically improved. More than 90 percent of the country's territory is under the control of the Syrian government. The self-proclaimed extremist Islamic State is on the verge of complete extinction. Other radical Islamist groups have been weakened. The more moderate anti-Assad opposition, despite large-scale military assistance from the United States and conservative Arab monarchies, is also significantly weakened, fragmented, militarily isolated and has lost the prospects of victory. The question of the future of President Bashar al-Assad has practically been removed from the Syrian political agenda.

What is striking is not that Russia, through its intervention, achieved a turning point in civil war in Syria, but with what limited Russian forces this was achieved. In essence, Russia managed to exclude the use of any significant ground forces and assets of its own and minimize losses. The Russian ground contingent remained insignificant throughout the two-year campaign, not exceeding in total a maximum of several thousand people - including private military companies and military police - of which, apparently, a maximum of several hundred were involved at a time, and with a very limited supply of military equipment. For Russia, this truly became a “cheap war”, including in terms of losses estimated at less than 100 people.


Director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (AST Center) Ruslan Pukhov © Defense News

The Russian aviation group in Syria is also small and at different times included only 30 to 50 combat aircraft and 16 to 40 helicopters, but it was involved with very high intensity. By the end of August 2017, Russian aviation in Syria had carried out more than 28 thousand sorties, claiming defeat of about 90 thousand targets, while by that time only one Su-24M aircraft had been lost. It may be recalled that in the Afghan War, one Soviet aircraft was lost on average every 750 sorties. Unmanned aerial vehicles have carried out more than 14 thousand flights in Syria.

There are several features that have contributed to the success of the Russian military campaign in Syria, making the company relatively “cheap”, and contrasting with the not-so-successful American approach in other regions of the world.

Firstly, Russia managed to create a very effective symbiosis of Syrian troops and its own contingent in Syria. The Russians took active measures to restore the combat effectiveness of the Syrian army, and the revived Syrian troops were often “reinforced” by small Russian support and special forces units. More importantly, Russian senior officers were not limited to the role of advisers, but in many key sectors led Syrian troops, which greatly increased the level of command and military expertise. Many of the main groups of Syrian troops are led by generals sent from Russia, and the 5th Volunteer Assault Corps, which acted as the main striking force of the Syrian army in the last year, was completely formed and equipped by Russians and is led by Russian commanders. It may not have been entirely politically correct, but it turned out to be completely effective.

Second, Russia was able to avoid committing significant ground forces of its own by replacing them with private military companies of well-paid mercenaries recruited primarily from retired Russian professional military personnel. Moreover, in contrast to US practice, the detachments of these companies were not used for auxiliary and security purposes, but directly as ground attack units, including for the aforementioned “reinforcement” of the Syrian forces. This proved very successful both from a military and a political point of view, minimizing any political costs of direct intervention. At the same time, Russian society demonstrated complete indifference to information about the losses of these private companies, rightly believing that “these people knew what they were doing for that kind of money.” Thus, contrary to Western expectations, the losses in Syria did not have any negative domestic political effect for the Putin administration.

In the West, surprisingly little attention has so far been paid to the success of the Russian military intervention in Syria and to the aspects of Russian military activity demonstrated thereby. It is clear that for many Western political and military observers, discouraged by unfounded forecasts about Putin getting bogged down in Syria, this topic does not look very attractive. Meanwhile, the military campaign in Syria and victory in it have large-scale consequences for the development of the Russian military machine.

During the relatively short two-year campaign in Syria, almost all senior Russian commanders were rotated through it. According to a statement made in November 2017 by the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, the grouping of troops in Syria with their headquarters “passed through all the commanders of military districts, combined arms armies and air force and air defense armies, almost all division commanders and more than half of the commanders combined arms brigades and regiments" of the Russian Armed Forces. All of these commanders had real-world experience of complex modern warfare in remote terrain, with the enormous role of intense air power and precision weapons, and with large-scale logistics and support challenges.

The phenomenon of such commanders with the experience of a successful and victorious military campaign for Russia in Syria, with a large-scale and decisive role of aviation and the widespread use of special operations forces and modern weapons, can have a significant impact on Russian military construction for a long time to come. At the same time, the confidence gained by the Russian military in Syria may contribute to a more firm and interventionist course in Russian foreign and military policy in the future.

The Kurdish presence in northeast Syria is discussed within a predetermined area. In fact, due to the crisis in the country, this problem does not have a clear regional dimension. In a relationship Syrian Kurds, at least at the political level, there are different factors at work than, for example, in relation to Iraqi Kurdistan. Kurds live in the territory between Turkey, Iraq and Syria. Talk of three cantons in northern Syria three years ago was one aspect of a partial change in Turkish geography, which later prompted Ankara to send Turkish troops into the Al Bab region.

The Kurdish areas form a wide dividing belt along the political borders of the countries in the region. But Syria plays a special role. It is she who can provide the Kurds with access to Mediterranean Sea. And if this happens, the balance of power could change dramatically throughout the Middle East. Perhaps this is why the Kurds do not represent an independent bloc in the negotiation process. They were present as part of other delegations: they are believed to be part of the solution to problems between the opposition and the Syrian government.

In practice, it was the United States that strongly opposed the creation of an independent delegation by the Kurds. During the second phase of negotiations in Geneva, when the Democratic Union Party was considered an ally of the government, despite its presence in the National Coordination Committee (NCC) of the Syrian opposition, Washington accused members of this party of direct coordination with the president. This became an important point of US policy, despite the subsequent alliance with the Kurds and the formation of the Syrian Democratic Forces after the Battle of Ain al-Arab.

According to the American scenario, after 2015, when the Russian military entered Syria, it was assumed that the Kurdish alliance with the tribes would become an important advantage for the Syrian opposition and an alternative to the dissolution of the opposition, which represented only Islamic forces and radical organizations. It is noteworthy that the script did not provide for independent representation of the Kurds, especially during the unification phase of the opposition delegation, so the Syrian Democratic Forces were an exception on the Syrian scene as a whole.

It is difficult to understand the American position regarding the past scenario and its implementation. Of course, Washington did not want a complete break with Turkey, imposing the Kurds as an independent project. At the same time, according to US President Donald Trump, he interacted with the Kurds not only to fight the Islamic State ( prohibited in the Russian Federation - approx. ed.). There are two key points in American policy towards the Kurds.

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Firstly, this is to ensure control over the Russian operation in Syria, so that Moscow cannot impose new reality on the Syrian-Iraqi border, as well as support from the Syrian Democratic Forces in the process of establishing “red lines” in front of Russia and annexing the eastern bank of the Euphrates to the Iraqi border.

Secondly, the United States wants Turkey to resist any strengthening of Russia at this stage. Ankara today is the main influential force that will turn the eastern bank of the Euphrates into the subject of negotiations between Russia and Turkey. The deployment of the Syrian army will not change the equation in favor of Russia, since it takes place in the de-escalation zones agreed upon by the guarantor countries of the Astana negotiations.

The eastern bank of the Euphrates will be subject to negotiations similar to the agreement on southwestern Syria, where the presence of armed forces operating outside state control is coming to an end in exchange for open space for subsequent negotiations. The situation on the Iraqi-Syrian-Turkish border today is different from what is happening on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, which will become a critical zone in the Middle East system as a whole.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.