The newest multi-purpose Russian nuclear boat "Gepard" of the 5th generation is designed to destroy aircraft carriers, as well as destroy coastal objects and targets.
"Gepard" is a multi-purpose nuclear submarine of the improved Project 971 (Bars class, according to NATO classification - "Akula-2").
The project was developed by the Malachite Marine Engineering Bureau. This is the eleventh Bars-class submarine produced at the Northern Engineering Enterprise since 1988. Two of them - "Gepard" and "Vepr" (adopted into the Northern Fleet in 1996) - have been significantly modernized. Russian designers claim that these nuclear-powered submarines are the quietest and fastest in the world.
On board the ship there are two DG-300 diesel generators with reversible converters (2 x 750 hp) with a fuel reserve for 10 days of operation. They are designed to generate direct current for propulsion electric motors and alternating current for general ship consumers.
The hydroacoustic complex MGK-503 "Skat-KS" with a digital information processing system has a powerful noise direction finding and sonar system. It includes a developed bow antenna, two long-range onboard antennas, as well as a towed long-range antenna located in a container located on the vertical tail (the dimensions of the container are much larger than those on the Project 671RTM nuclear submarine). In addition to the SAC, Project 971 nuclear submarines are equipped with a highly effective, unparalleled worldwide system for detecting enemy submarines and surface ships using their wake (the equipment installed on the boat makes it possible to record such a wake many hours after the passage of an enemy submarine).
The ship is equipped with the Medveditsa-971 navigation complex, as well as the Molniya-M radio communication system with the Symphony space communications system and a towed antenna.
The torpedo-missile system includes four torpedo tubes with a caliber of 533 mm and four torpedo tubes with a caliber of 533 mm (the total ammunition load is more than 40 units of weapons, including 28 with a caliber of 533 mm). It is equipped to fire Granat cruise missiles, underwater missiles and Shkval, Vodopad and Veter missile-torpedoes, as well as torpedoes and self-transporting mines. In addition, the boat can lay conventional mines. The firing of Granit cruise missiles is controlled by a special hardware complex.
In the 90s The universal deep-sea homing torpedo UGST, created by the Research Institute of Marine Thermal Engineering and the State Research and Production Enterprise Region, entered service with submarines. It replaced the TEST-71M electric anti-submarine torpedo and the 53-65K high-speed anti-ship torpedo.
At the same time, on the basis of the Soviet-American agreements of 1989, weapons systems with nuclear weapons were excluded from the armament of multi-purpose nuclear submarines - the Shkval and Vodopad missile-torpedoes with SBC, as well as 28 long-range cruise missiles RK-55 Granit "to destroy coastal targets at a range of up to 3000 km, which can be equipped with a nuclear warhead with a yield of 200 kilotons.
The lead nuclear-powered vessel of the 971st project - K-284 - was laid down on the banks of the Amur in 1980 and entered service on December 30, 1984. Already during its testing, the achievement of a qualitatively higher level of acoustic stealth was demonstrated. The noise level of the K-284 was 12-15 dB (i.e. 4-4.5 times) lower than the noise level of the “quiest” domestic boat of the previous generation - 671RTM. According to NATO classification, the new nuclear submarines received the designation Akula.
After the first “simply Sharks”, ships appeared, called Improved Akula in the West (probably, these included boats built in Severodvinsk, as well as the last “Komsomol” ships). Compared to their predecessors, they had better stealth than the US Navy's improved Los Angeles-class boats (SSN-688-I).
In 1996, the submarine cruiser Vepr, built in Severodvinsk, entered service. While maintaining the same contours, it had a new design of a durable body and internal “filling”. Once again, a serious leap forward was made in the field of noise reduction. In the West, this ship (as well as subsequent nuclear submarines of the 971st project) was called Akula-2.
According to US naval intelligence, the durable hull of the modernized Barsa has a 4 m long insert. The additional tonnage made it possible, in particular, to equip the boat with “active” systems for reducing vibration of the power plant, almost completely eliminating its impact on the ship’s hull. According to American experts, in terms of stealth characteristics, the modernized boat of Project 971 is approaching the level of the American fourth-generation multi-purpose nuclear submarine SSN-21 Seawolf.
High stealth and combat stability give the Bars the ability to successfully overcome anti-submarine lines equipped with stationary long-range hydroacoustic surveillance systems, as well as counter anti-submarine forces. They can operate in the enemy’s zone of dominance and deliver sensitive missile and torpedo strikes. The armament of the Bars allows them to fight submarines and surface ships, as well as hit ground targets with high precision with cruise missiles.
The underwater speed reaches 36 knots. In autonomous mode, the submarine can operate for up to 100 days. Crew - 61 people.
Gepard's predecessors left the plant two years after its foundation. Before “Cheetah” there were “Leopard”, “Panther”, “Wolf”, “Leopard”, “Tiger”, “Boar”. Sailors call this series of boats cat, although officially Project 971, to which “Gepard” belongs, has the code “Pike-B”, and according to the NATO classification - “Akula-2”. Despite the difference in names, they are all close to the new boat. They note one main feature of the “cat” series - silent running. These are third generation boats.
Even under the most favorable conditions, the American Los Angeles-class submarine, which has the most advanced hydroacoustics, will be able to detect a “cat” boat no further than 10 kilometers away. This distance is critical. A nuclear submarine that has crept up unnoticed can already carry out its combat mission without hindrance.
American naval analyst N. Polmer noted at a hearing in the National Security Committee of the US House of Representatives: “The appearance of Akula-class submarines, as well as other third-generation Russian nuclear submarines, demonstrated that Soviet shipbuilders were closing the noise gap faster than expected. . In 1994 it became known that the gap no longer existed.”
The “Cat” series of boats is the closest relative of the Project 945 Barracuda nuclear submarine created at the Lazurit Central Design Bureau in Nizhny Novgorod. Let us recall that this boat is deep-sea, with a titanium hull. Today the name of its chief designer is widely known - Hero of Russia Nikolai Kvasha.
By May 1990, six submarines of this type had been built.
The Barracuda had one significant drawback. It was very expensive, and not every Russian shipyard where submarines were made could work with titanium. The fleet needed a series of submarines of a wide profile, cheap and easy to build. Project 945 was taken as a basis, but the boat's hull was made of low-magnetic steel. The new series of boats was assigned to Project 971.
This series of nuclear submarines inherited its “cat” name from the first Russian boats of the early 20th century. The former “Gepard” was laid down in September 1913 at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg. A year and a half later, the boat was already commissioned as warships. She participated in the First World War, providing search and reconnaissance operations on enemy sea lanes. The boat made 15 combat missions. But in October 1917, while on patrol in the Baltic Sea, she disappeared without a trace. The cause of the tragedy and the place of death have not yet been established.
A series of Project 971 boats was developed by Leningraders. In addition to being quiet, the boats are also formidable. The torpedo-missile system includes a total ammunition load of more than 40 units of weapons. The boats can launch Granat cruise missiles, underwater missiles and Shkval, Vodopad and Veter torpedo missiles. The boat can also be used as a minelayer.
With the appearance in the waters of the northern seas and on Pacific Ocean“cat” nuclear submarines, the Americans had to forget the words that they constantly repeated: “Russian submarines are larger than ours, but they are poorly made.”
And the head of the US Navy operational detachment, Admiral Jeremy Borda, having analyzed all the contacts of his boats with the “cat” series submarines, came to the conclusion that in terms of their low noise they correspond to fourth-generation boats.
Concerned about the rapid development of Russian submarine shipbuilding, the American side made an attempt to involve the international non-governmental environmental organization Greenpeace in the planned operation. Obeying her customers, she transferred all her activities to the northern seas, fighting their nuclear contamination. As soon as the construction of new submarines in Russia stopped, Greenpeace immediately left the northern waters.
There was another incident related to these boats. In the early 80s, our country acquired unique high-precision metal-cutting machines from the Japanese company Toshiba. The deal was secret, but the press found out about it and immediately trumpeted it around the world. These machines made it possible to use new technologies in the processing of propeller shafts and propeller blades, thereby sharply reducing the noise level of the submarine. The United States, having learned about the deal, immediately announced to Toshiba the introduction of economic sanctions. But it was already too late.
The boat's hull has a hydroacoustic coating and is divided into seven main compartments. Comfortable conditions have been created for the crew: a relaxation room, a gym and even a small sauna with a swimming pool. The living quarters for four people are very similar to the compartments of a passenger train.
An interesting incident occurred on February 29, 1996, in the midst of NATO exercises. Warships were searching for a hypothetical underwater enemy. The training task was completed, when suddenly... a Russian submarine made contact. Her commander asked for help. It was necessary to urgently evacuate a sailor with an acute attack of appendicitis.
For the British to whom the request was addressed, it was a shock. Until now, they are at a loss: whether help was really needed, or whether this was a well-planned operation. When the boat surfaced, everyone saw that it was in the very center of the order of NATO ships. If the combat situation was real...
"Cheetah" at operating speed, allowing it to quickly survey a fairly large area, is not detected at all by existing sonar equipment. And even when he picks up speed, he is able to “see” and “hear” any adversary in the ocean before he notices him.
The Americans were also shocked when they “accidentally” discovered our “Pike” near their territorial waters.
Another “Pike” distinguished itself in the summer of 1999 during the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia. Then there was a message that our submarine had been spotted in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea. She was actually noticed when she passed the narrow Strait of Gibraltar. But then she disappeared. After some time, she appeared off the coast of Corsica and Yugoslavia. She was hunted by both surface ships and anti-submarine aircraft. After playing hide and seek, the boat calmly left the Mediterranean Sea.
The shock came later when NATO headquarters learned that along with the Pike, which they had noticed at least for a short time, the submarine cruiser Kursk and Barracuda (Pskov) were in the Mediterranean Sea. They were discovered only when they were already returning to their native shores.
According to representatives of the US Navy, at operational speeds of the order of 5-7 knots, the noise of Improved Akula class boats, recorded by hydroacoustic reconnaissance, was less than the noise of the most advanced US Navy nuclear submarines of the Improved Los Angeles class.
According to the Chief of Operations of the US Navy, Admiral D. Burda, American ships were unable to accompany the Improved Akula nuclear submarine at speeds less than 6-9 knots (contact with the new Russian submarine took place in the spring of 1995 off the east coast of the United States). According to the admiral, the improved Akula-2 nuclear submarine meets the requirements for fourth-generation boats in terms of low noise characteristics.
The appearance of new super-stealthy nuclear-powered ships in the Russian fleet after the end of the Cold War caused serious concern in the United States. In 1991, this issue was raised in Congress. Several proposals were put forward for discussion by American legislators aimed at rectifying the current situation in favor of the United States. In accordance with them, it was assumed, in particular:
- demand that our country make its long-term programs in the field of submarine shipbuilding public;
- establish for the Russian Federation and the United States agreed restrictions on the quantitative composition of multi-purpose nuclear submarines;
- provide assistance to Russia in re-equipping shipyards building nuclear submarines to produce non-military products.
The international non-governmental environmental organization Greenpeace also joined the campaign to combat Russian submarine shipbuilding, which actively advocated the ban on submarines with nuclear power plants (primarily, of course, Russian ones, which, according to the “greens,” pose the greatest environmental danger). In order to “eliminate nuclear disasters,” Greenpeace recommended that governments Western countries make the provision of financial assistance to Russia dependent on the resolution of this issue.
The American side is also concerned about the fact that India, China and South Korea. Moreover, the Indian Navy got there before everyone else. The terms for the purchase of two submarines, which are now being completed on the slipways of Sevmash, were discussed.
It’s a pity, of course, that this strategic reserve is going to the side, but these are the realities, otherwise our Navy would not have received the Gepard.
Currently, all multi-purpose nuclear submarines of Project 971 are part of the Northern (Yagelnaya Bay) and Pacific (Rybachy) fleets. They are quite actively (of course, by the standards of the present time) used for combat service.
The last voyage of the Black Sea Fleet submarine "Shch-211" is another unknown page of the Great Patriotic War.
Unusual find
In August 2001, the fourth historical and ethnographic expedition “Walking across Three Seas” started in Sevastopol from the Grafskaya pier, conducted with the support of the Russian Navy, the government of the Russian capital and the international organization UNESCO. Its participants were seven schoolchildren from Moscow and Sevastopol, who won this honorary right based on the results of the scientific conference “Archipelago Expeditions of the Russian Fleet.”On the yacht "Perseus" young travelers passed through the places of military glory of the Russian fleet through the Black, Marmara and Aegean seas. In Bulgaria, they learned with interest that last fall, about 8 miles from Varna, in the area of Cape Galata, at a depth of about 20 meters, local fishermen discovered a submarine from the Second World War, presumably Soviet. The Bulgarian side was in no hurry to officially report the find for two good reasons. Firstly, doubts remained about the identity of the submarine lying on the seabed, and secondly, it was in this area of the Black Sea in 1941 - 1942. several submarines of the Black Sea Fleet were lost at once, so the possibility of re-discovery of the already known “unit” was not excluded.
Returning to their native Sevastopol, the guys immediately reported the unusual find of the Bulgarian fishermen to the command of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Soon a corresponding request was sent to the General Headquarters of the Bulgarian Navy. The answer did not come immediately: in order to say something concrete about the submarine lying at the bottom, not only its external inspection with the help of divers was required, but also serious work with archival documents.
For this, retired captain III rank Rosen Gevshekov, who served as a senior diving officer naval base Bulgarian Navy in Varna, organized a team of scuba divers, which included members of the local diving club "Relic - 2002". As a result of several dives, it was established that at the bottom in the indicated area there really was a Soviet submarine from the Great Patriotic War of the "Shch" type, similar to the submarine "Shch-204", discovered in 1983 20 miles from Varna and examined by Bulgarian and Soviet specialists for a possible rise.
After the underwater stage of research on the as-yet unnamed “Pike,” Gevshekov began archival searches that were supposed to answer the main question: what number could she have worn? Active correspondence with the St. Petersburg Naval Museum, work with documents from the Varna Museum and still living witnesses of those distant events led to the expected result. Now, with a greater degree of probability, it could be argued that the fishing find was the submarine "Shch-211", which in November 1941 set out on its next military campaign, from which it was never destined to return to its home base...
Lucky "PIKE"
Laid down on September 3, 1934 in Nikolaev at the N200 plant (named after the 61st communard), "Shch-211", which had serial number 1035, was launched exactly 2 years later, and on May 5, 1938 it became part of the Black Sea Fleet.By the beginning of the war, the Soviet Union had quite powerful submarine forces in the Black Sea. All Black Sea submarines were consolidated into two brigades consisting of 44 ships of six types, mostly Soviet-built. Only five boats of type "A" (previously called "AG" - "American Holland") were inherited by the fleet from the Russian Imperial Navy. The first brigade of submarines, commanded by Captain 1st Rank P. Boltunov, consisted of four divisions and numbered 22 boats. "Shch-211" was part of the 4th division under the command of captain III rank B. Uspensky, along with the submarines "Shch-212", "Shch-213", "Shch-214" and "Shch-215". It was the “Pikes” that were the main type of medium-tonnage boats of the Soviet Navy (V-bis, V-bis-2, X, and X-bis series)...
The submarine of the Black Sea Fleet "Shch-211" could rightfully be called lucky. On August 15, 1941, it was her crew under the command of Lieutenant Commander Alexander Devyatko who opened the combat account of the Black Sea submariners by sinking the large enemy transport Peles, which was sailing from the Bulgarian Burgas to the Romanian port of Constanta with military cargo on board. In the next 3 months of the war, the Shch-211, which regularly hunted enemy convoys off the coast of Bulgaria, came under powerful attacks three times from Bulgarian, Romanian and German escort aircraft, during one of which 12 depth charges were dropped on it. However, in an incomprehensible way, the “Pike” always managed to escape unharmed from heavy enemy fire, successfully avoiding mine traps and simultaneously achieving new combat successes.
On September 29, during the transition from Varna to Burgas, the Italian tanker Superga loaded with oil sank to the bottom from her torpedo; on November 14, the Romanian minelayer Prince Carol, heading for Varna, with under-equipped mines on board. On the same day, sea fortune turned away from its favorite submariners for the only and last time...
Submarine warfare
Then senior lieutenant Alexander Devyatko took command of the Shch-211 submarine in Sevastopol on the first day of the war - June 22, 1941. By that time, the enemy had already established an uninterrupted supply of its troops by sea. In this Germany was actively helped by monarchical Bulgaria. Legally being a non-combatant ally of the “Third Reich,” it nevertheless took a direct part in the hostilities against the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. The Bulgarian Air Force's "Sborno Troyvovo Yato" (squadron, soon expanded to a "bracket" - regiment) provided anti-submarine defense for the naval convoys of Germany and its allied countries, receiving combat missions from the representative of the German "Kriegsmarine" in Varna.The position taken by Bulgaria, naturally, could not help but irritate the Soviet leadership. A real undeclared war was launched against the German satellite. As a result, in Bulgarian territorial waters, Black Sea Fleet submarines were actively used not only to fight enemy convoys and lay mines, but also to secretly land groups of Bulgarian underground fighters on Bulgarian territory to organize partisan movements and sabotage actions deep behind enemy lines.
On August 11, Alexander Devyatko’s crew successfully completed one of these risky missions. In stormy conditions and pitch darkness, at every minute the risk of being blown up by mines, with which the enemy generously littered all approaches to the Bulgarian shores, "Shch-211" landed a group of 14 Bulgarian communists under the command of Colonel Tsvyatko Radoinov at the mouth of the Kamchia River. In total, in August - September 1941, 7 such landing forces were sent to Bulgaria, trained at the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army (today's GRU). Just four days later, the Shch-211, by destroying the enemy transport Peles, opens the combat account of the Black Sea submariners. This date can be considered the beginning of active submarine warfare in the Black Sea. During the first five months of hostilities, the Black Sea forces in total destroyed 3 submarines, 2 monitors, 20 auxiliary ships and 7 enemy transports. The total tonnage of enemy losses amounted to more than 41 thousand tons. In total, until the end of 1941, Black Sea Fleet submarines made 103 combat missions. Among the destroyed ships were 2 of the 5 large Italian tankers owned by the Nazis. For this reason, Germany and Italy experienced serious interruptions in oil supplies from Romania for a long time. As already mentioned, one of these tankers, the Superga, is in service with the Shch-211.
However, victories at sea came at too high a price for the Black Sea Fleet. Submarines leaving for combat missions perished along with their crews one after another, mostly by being blown up by mines off the Bulgarian and Romanian coasts: "Shch-206", "M-58", "M-34", "M-59", "S-34". On November 14, 1941, “Shch-211” was added to this mournful list, in December - “Shch-204”. In total, about 300 trained submariners died in the first 5 months of the war alone. They tried to make up for the losses by urgently commissioning unfinished submarines evacuated from Nikolaev, the crews for which were formed on the fly from among undertrained sailors from surface ships. In addition, as a result of Stalin’s repressions, which mercilessly drove out truly experienced submarine commanders from the naval ranks, very young officers began to be appointed to command positions, and some of them, by a strong-willed decision of the higher headquarters, were sent to ships from the army and even... from cavalry units. Of course, all this did not have the best effect on the quality of training of submarine crews. By and large, in the initial period of the war, the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet did not have a single plan for the actions of its submarine forces. For some reason, the naval command was confident that the Romanian Navy was actively being strengthened by German submarines and their attack on our bases was a matter of the very near future. As a result, most Soviet submarines waited for the enemy at their bases, regularly observing the only Romanian submarine that did not take any action. The same boats that were heading to enemy shores regularly attacked the same mine “rake” - reconnaissance of the designated positions was not carried out. The vaults of the Central Naval Archive contain the devastating directive of the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov, regarding the Black Sea Fleet Military Council "On the results of the submarine war for 6 months of 1941." For a more complete understanding of the difficult situation in which the Black Sea submariners had to operate, this eloquent document is worth quoting in full.
“The results of the submarine war of the Black Sea Fleet for 6 months of the war show absolutely unsatisfactory results and your failure to comply with my orders regarding the use of submarines. Of the total number of 44 submarines of the Black Sea Fleet at the beginning of the war and 54 by the end of the period, 7 enemy transports were sunk in six months, at the same time 7 were killed our submarines. Thus, each transport costs us the price of one boat.
For comparison, I inform you that the Northern Fleet, having 15 submarines at the beginning of the war and 21 boats at the end of the period, sank 48 enemy transports without losing a single boat. Conditions in the North are different from the Black Sea, but no less complex and difficult.
Reasons for the failure of submarine warfare on enemy communications: 1. Weak submarine tension. Only 5-6 submarines were deployed on enemy communications from the Bosphorus to Odessa. On November 18, you were ordered to increase the number of positions to 14. Instead, the number of positions was reduced to 3.
2. Aimless use of submarines for purposes other than their intended purpose, such as shelling Yalta with one cannon, which I forbade you to do. Now a landing party of 20 people from a submarine has been landed in Koktebel, which could have been successfully done by a Defense Ministry boat.
3. Aimless patrol of submarines in front of Poti, where during 6 months of the war not a single enemy ship or submarine appeared, which I also pointed out to you. 4. Poor work of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in terms of planning and organizing submarine operations, without analyzing the situation, without helping submarines in ensuring the solution of their main task. There is no reconnaissance of the positions themselves. It is obvious that "Shch-204", "Shch-211", "S-34" were killed, and "Shch-205" and "L-4" were blown up at position N28, and yet the submarines continued to be sent one after another and to On December 24, Shch-207 was sent there.
I expect the implementation of my orders on the use of submarines and the report that you made as a result of analyzing the experience of the first six months of the war in order to reduce the losses of your submarines and increase the impact on enemy communications. KUZNETSOV".
The corresponding conclusions from the document were drawn, but they could no longer stop the continuing increase in combat losses: in total, more than half of the submarines of the Black Sea Fleet were lost during the war years.
At the same time, the obvious miscalculations of the naval command did not in any way detract from the true heroism of the submarine crews, who alone entered into an unequal battle with the ships and aircraft guarding enemy convoys. The submariners understood that each torpedo strike that reached the target inexorably brought the long-awaited Victory Day closer, on the altar of which they selflessly sacrificed their lives...
The mystery of the death of "Shch-211"
Big research, carried out by Bulgarian enthusiasts, made it possible to reconstruct in detail the chronicle of the events of the last day of the lost "Pike". On November 14, 1941, the Shch-211, which was in a combat position, took bearings off Cape Galata of the Romanian minelayer Prince Carol, which was heading for Varna. However, the first torpedo attack by our submariners turns out to be unsuccessful. Taking advantage of the pause, the commander of the Romanian ship reports an attack on a German military airfield located in the area of Lake Varna. The second torpedo salvo of the "Pike" reaches its target: the "Prince Carol" goes to the bottom 5 miles from Varna. Having convinced himself that the enemy ship has been defeated, the commander of "Shch-211" gives the command to surface. On the surface and at maximum speed, the submarine begins to move away in a south-easterly direction. However, 3 miles from the sinking site of the Prince Carol, the Pike is overtaken by a German plane. Having received severe damage to the hull from bombs dropped on it, the submarine sinks. The next day, storm waves will wash ashore near the village of Shkorpilovtsy with terrible evidence of the death of the Soviet submarine: the disfigured body of the senior assistant commander, a torn landing boat and a dented tank with fuel. It is interesting that the sequence of events described by the Bulgarians on that distant tragic day has nothing to do with official version death of "Shch-211". According to Soviet data, the "Pike" of Lieutenant Commander Devyatko was blown up by a mine in the area of Cape Shabler on November 16, 1941, that is, two days later.The discrepancy in dates cannot but surprise. Some Soviet sources even claim that “Shch-211” “went out on another combat mission on November 16, did not make contact and did not return to base at the appointed time. Presumably it was blown up by a mine and died in the Varna area.” But if we take into account that the Pike left Sevastopol only on November 16, then it could not have appeared in the Varna area on the same day: the submarine’s passage would have taken much longer. Most likely, the date of the death of Shch-211 is approximate, because the Soviet side did not have any specific evidence indicating either the exact day of the tragedy or its actual causes. Meanwhile, German pilots clearly recorded on November 14 the fact of the sinking of a Soviet submarine as a result of the bombing. Despite the fact that domestic military historians are still skeptical about the effectiveness of the use of German depth charges by aviation against submarines and claim that not a single one of the Black Sea Fleet submarines was destroyed from the air in 1941, the Bulgarian version of the death of Shch-211 seems more plausible. The lens of an underwater video camera captured numerous damage to the submarine’s hull, which a mine alone could not cause. In addition, the above-mentioned directive of the People's Commissar of the Navy speaks in favor of the Bulgarian version. Admiral Kuznetsov clearly distinguishes between the concepts of “died” and “exploded.” The latter does not apply to Shch-211.
Under state protection
The further fate of the found "Pike" is the topic of future consultations and meetings of Russian and Bulgarian representatives. As a rule, any actions regarding sunken and lost ships are carried out in accordance with intergovernmental agreements. According to the Law of the Russian Federation “On perpetuating the memory of those killed in defense of the Fatherland,” adopted in 1993, the sites where warships and their crews were lost are military graves, are subject to state registration and are protected by the state. Their maintenance on the territory of other states is carried out in the manner determined by interstate treaties and agreements.Lifting the Shch-211, due to severe damage to the hull, can hardly be considered advisable. Despite the fact that the bow torpedo tubes are most likely empty (the Romanian ship was attacked twice), there is still a danger of an explosion of the spare torpedoes located on the racks and in the stern tubes of the submarine. Most likely, in relation to the Shch-211, the scheme already worked out in June 1983 by the Search and Rescue Directorate of the Black Sea Fleet for inspecting the Shch-204 submarine, which perished on December 6, 1941, also off the coast of Bulgaria, will be applied. Then the 28th Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense concluded that it was unsafe to raise the submarine due to the dubious state of the torpedo combat charging compartments. Preparations for the planned rise of the "Pike" were stopped. The submarine's hull was cleared of fragments of nets and fouling, the upper deckhouse hatch was opened, and after examining the central post and compartments, the remains of the submariners and part of the ship's documentation were raised to the surface. At the end of the work, which was carried out for 45 days, the upper conning hatch was welded shut, and the remains of the crew members were buried in Sevastopol. The bow gun from the submarine is now one of the most valuable exhibits of the Museum of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation.
Point of memory and sorrow
On nautical charts point with coordinates 42 53 min. 8 sec. north latitude and 28 03 min. 6 sec. eastern longitude is the place where military honors are given in memory of the crews of the submarines "Shch-204", "S-34", "Shch-211" and others who died while operating on enemy communications in the western part of the Black Sea during the Great Patriotic War.In Bulgaria itself, the memory of Shch-211 is honored in a special way. One of the streets in Varna is named after Alexander Devyatko, and for a long time the Bulgarian side annually invited the families of the deceased submariners to its world-famous Golden Sands resort. If the remains of the dead crew are removed from the hull of the Shchuka, which has become an underwater necropolis, Sevastopol will honor its heroes. Through the grinding of enemy mines and the echoing explosions of depth charges, they rushed to their home base to report a new victory for the Black Sea people. Today, when more than half a century separates us from the war, their failed return to their native shores must finally take place.
Their project was developed in the design bureau, which was headed by B. M. Malinin. Performance characteristics submarines of this type changed slightly from series to series in the direction of increasing the power of diesel engines and slightly reducing the cruising range, as well as increasing the underwater speed. The armament (four bow and two stern torpedo tubes, two 45-mm guns) remained unchanged. Boats of the III series of the "Shch" type had six compartments: the first and sixth - torpedo compartments; the second is residential (there are batteries under a collapsible flooring made of wooden panels, fuel tanks under the batteries); third compartment - central post; the fourth is diesel; in the fifth there were two main electric motors and, separately, two electric motors for economic propulsion.
According to the classification accepted before the war, it was a medium-sized submarine (displacement 578 tons), one and a half hull, with a durable hull divided into six compartments. Its main armament consisted of four bow and two stern torpedo tubes (total number of torpedoes - 10), surface speed - up to 12 knots and underwater - up to 8-9 knots, maximum diving depth - 90 m. For submarines of the III series, an architectural design was adopted hull shape with boules and a straight vertical stem. This hull shape was chosen to ensure the required surface speed, good controllability and maneuverability. The main ballast tanks were placed in boules (three on each side), as well as in the bow and stern ends. The “medium”, “equalization” and “fast submersion” tanks were located inside a durable hull (during the period of major overhaul of the boats, the “medium” main ballast tank was moved into the double-hull space). The Kingston tanks of the main ballast tanks had local manual drives, and the ventilation valves, in addition to local manual drives, had remote pneumatic control. On the submarine Shch-302, tests were carried out on an experimental device for blowing the main ballast tanks with diesel, driven by the main electric motor and operating in compressor mode. Tests have confirmed the reliability of blowing water ballast using this method. The time for blowing the main ballast tanks with diesel was 5 min 35 s at 415 rpm and 10 min 5 s at 200 rpm. This was the first experience of using diesel engines for blowing main ballast on domestic submarines. He convinced the designers and crew that in the future it would be possible to abandon the use of turbo-blowers on submarines, which are a rather complex unit that is not reliable enough in operation. The first two submarines of the III series were equipped with MAN diesel engines of type 8U28/38 with a power of 2x500 hp. With. at 450 rpm. Subsequent boats were equipped with domestically produced 38B8 diesel engines of the same power. The rotation speed on them was subsequently increased to 600 rpm, while the diesel power increased to 685 hp. s., and the surface speed of the boat reached 12 knots. The main electric motors had a power of 2X400 hp. With. at 390 rpm. The submarine was equipped with electric propulsion motors with a power of 2X19 hp. With. at 900 rpm.
On series III submarines, many technical solutions were adopted the same as on series II submarines, for example, the design of pipes and front covers of torpedo tubes, a voltage-reducing unit to maintain a constant voltage, diesel injection mufflers, etc. State tests of III submarines The series also revealed a number of shortcomings: the full speed was obtained 2.2 knots less than the specification, the design of the torpedo-loading device was unsuccessful, the mechanisms were very noisy, especially economic drives, periscope winches and bilge pumps, habitability was worse than provided for by the design.
The raised and examined English boat L-55 (since October 1929 had been undergoing restoration in Kronstadt) had a great influence on the project. From her, the “Pike” got lines with linear transformation and a general architectural type: one-and-a-half-hull, with Boolean main ballast tanks. Due to the simplicity of the contours and some technological solutions, it was planned to achieve a significant reduction in the cost of the entire structure. Five compartments were separated from each other by flat, strong bulkheads with oval doors designed for a pressure of two atmospheres. The torpedo armament consisted of four bow and two stern torpedo tubes. The battery (112 cells), covered with easily removable shields, occupied the second compartment, diesel engines and electric propulsion motors were located together in the fourth. The third compartment contained the central post. Two Rato pumps were supposed to pump out the main ballast. It is interesting to note that the use of pumps for pumping out main ballast was abandoned in all fleets of the world back in the First World War. world war. In the case of the “pikes”, this anachronism was resurrected precisely on the basis of saving funds allocated for construction. For the same reasons, the bow horizontal rudders did not have guards.
During the construction process, a number of noticeable improvements were made to the ships. The fourth compartment was divided by a light bulkhead into two - diesel engines and electric motors, resulting in six compartments on the boat. The middle tank was in a durable casing. The main ballast was received in five tanks. To improve seaworthiness, deck tanks and a bow buoyancy tank were installed (removed during major repairs). The superstructure and deckhouse turned out to be narrow. The bow horizontal rudders were located in the bow trim tank, and the electric motor for remote control of the rudders was located in the central control post. Horizontal rudders received guards. Most of the VVD cylinders (40 pcs.) were placed in the second compartment, the remaining 16, together with the main electric motors, were located in the fifth. The diesel oil pump is gear type. The rear covers of the torpedo tubes were closed with hinged bolts on the bolts, and not with ratchet bolts, as on boats of the I and II series. There were five fuel tanks located inside the durable hull. The 37-mm machine gun envisaged by the project never entered service, and in its place a 45-mm semi-automatic 21-K was installed. The bulwark in the bow of the wheelhouse, designed to protect the gun in a positional position, was soon removed, installing semicircular folding platforms for ease of calculation. During the major renovation, the site became permanent, with a tubular railing fencing.
During the acceptance process of the first Shchuka series III, which took place from October 1933 to August 1934, a construction overload was revealed that reached from 5.7 to 25 tons (this was partly explained by the addition of spare torpedoes). The shortfall in surface speed was 2.2 knots for boats with German W8V28/38 diesel engines from the MAI company ("Pike" and "Okun"), and 1.75 knots for boats with domestic 38B8 engines from the Kolomna Plant ("Ruff" and "Komsomolets"). The reason lay both in incorrectly selected screws and in the shape of the body, which led to the overlap of waves of ends and boules. As a result, the speed of the III series Shchuk was 11.8 knots. above and 8 knots. under the water. At the same time, the cruising range turned out to be greater than the calculated one: 3130 miles instead of 3000 and 112 miles instead of 110, respectively.
During testing when diving to full depth, the lead boat suffered deformation of the fillet of the aft torpedo-loading hatch. At the same time, the rescue buoy of the first compartment was crushed. Based on the test results, local reinforcement of the hull had to be carried out.
Seaworthiness was considered satisfactory. However, there were plenty of shortcomings: a design defect was discovered in the drive of the horizontal rudders - under the influence of deformation of the hull at a depth of 40-50 m, it jammed; the time for draining the main ballast using Rato centrifugal pumps was almost 20 minutes, which was completely unacceptable; the cramped internal layout, poor design of the torpedo-loading device, and high noise levels of the mechanisms were noted.
They tried to eliminate a number of miscalculations immediately. Shch-303 received other propellers and additional fittings in the nose of the boules to improve streamlining. The main ballast pumping system, which, in addition to taking a long time to drain, also created a dangerous list during ascent, was redone. First, in place of one of the pumps, a low-pressure turbocharger of the Brown-Boveri type was installed to blow through the main ballast tanks, and later at Okun they tested a more efficient blowing system using diesel engines driven by electric motors as compressors. The effect was positive: the blowing time ranged from 10 to 4.5 minutes. This system was used on the “Pike” in the future.
Acceptance tests confirmed the high advantages of Series III submarines: the simplicity and strength of their designs, the reliability of the mechanisms, and good seaworthiness. Submarines of the III series in their tactical and technical elements and characteristics were in no way inferior to foreign submarines of this class, for example, the French Orion-class submarines, which were built simultaneously with our submarines.
| Displacement - surface - 572 tons, underwater - 672 tons |
| Maximum length - 57 m |
| Maximum width - 6.2 m |
| Average draft - 3.76 m |
| Power point - 2 diesel engines with a total power of 1000 hp. and 2 electric motors with a total power of 800 hp. 2 groups of rechargeable batteries, 112 batteries each, brand "KSM-2", 2 screws. |
| Fuel reserve - normal - 23.4 tons, full - 52 tons |
| Speed - highest surface - 11.6 knots, underwater - 8.5 knots |
| Cruising range - on the surface - 1350 miles at 11.6 knots, - 3130 at 8.5 knots; submerged - 9 miles at 8.5 knots, - 112 miles at 2.8 knots |
| Immersion depth - working - 75 meters, maximum - 90 meters |
| Dive time - 75 seconds |
| Armament - 4 533 mm bow torpedo tubes; 2 533 mm aft torpedo tubes; 10 533 mm torpedoes; 1 - 45/46 artillery installation "21-K"; 500 45mm rounds |
| Time spent under water - 72 hours |
| Autonomy - normal - 20 days, maximum - 40 |
| Buoyancy reserve - 22 % |
| Crew - 7 officers, 15 petty officers, 18 privates |
"Shch-301" ("Pike")
Laid down on February 5, 1930 in Leningrad at plant number 189, factory number 199. December 1, 1930 launched. On October 14, 1933 it became part of Marine forces Baltic Sea. Participated in the Soviet-Finnish War.
On June 22, 1941, she met under the command of Lieutenant Commander Ivan Vasilyevich Grachev as part of the Separate Submarine Training Division in Orienbaum.
August 10-28, 1941 She went out on her first military campaign in the Second World War. At 17.21 on August 10, she entered the Stockholm area (position No. 10) guarded by BTShch-203, 207, 209, 210, 218, 4 SKA, in the afternoon of 11.8 the escort was completed on the meridian of Cape Ristna. Patrolled the position from 22.30 on August 12 to August 27. Around noon on August 17, the boat discovered the OTR, went on the attack, but when filling the annular gap of the bow TA, it took 4 tons of water into the trim tank and sank to depth. On August 18, I discovered a stitch. EM type "Gothenburg", going in the direction of the island. Gotland. At about 10 p.m. on August 19, she discovered KON on the surface, but was illuminated by a searchlight and, after diving, was attacked by the main vessel. After 25 minutes, having surfaced to a positional position, we found a TR without a move and a receding EM in the north-west. At about 23.50 a torpedo attack was carried out on the TR (TR 8000 t, attack = above/vi/2, d = 3-4 cables, after a few seconds 2 explosions were heard - the torpedoes exploded next to the German TR "Theda Fritzen"). There was no persecution. On August 23, the submarine tried to attack another TP, but the attack failed because a torpedo started working in the TA before the salvo. At 14.53 on August 24, she made torpedo attack KON (3 TR, 1 EM, 2 SKA) (TR 6-8000 t, attack = sub/pr/1, d = 6 cab., a hit was observed in the TR - a torpedo trail was observed from the Swedish EM). There was no persecution. On August 25 and August 26, the submarine observed 2 Swiss. BBO and several others. EMs conducting exercises in the area of the Landsort settlement. On the night of August 27, she was recalled to Tallinn in connection with the preparations to leave the base. At about 7 p.m. on August 28, she independently arrived at the Tallinn roadstead.
On August 28, 1941, she arrived in Tallinn, discovered that our forces were not there, and independently headed to Kronstadt. On the same day at 21.15 at the point 59°52"N/25°16"E. (according to the logbook; according to the results of research by I.A. Kireev - 25 ° 21 "E) was blown up by a mine of the "F.18" obstacle, installed by the financial Ministry of Health "Ruotsin-salmi" and "Riilahti" (or the obstacle "D.22", exhibited by the German MTSH 5th flotilla), but remained afloat. The commander, having battened down the hatch, descended from the bridge and personally examined the aft part where the explosion occurred: the propeller shafts were bent upward, the sixth compartment was opened, from the aft a torpedo fell out of the apparatus, the superstructure was torn apart. Two sailors climbed out of the ragged hole in the sixth compartment onto the deck. The commander went down inside the submarine and was convinced that the struggle for survivability was useless, water was already entering the fourth compartment, and the trim aft was increasing. After 15 minutes, the submarine sank By this time, the approaching SKA rescued 14 crew members (1 died on board) and transferred them to the Vironia TR (died in a mine on the night of August 28; the submarine commander Grachev and the commander of the bilge Brewers squad survived from the crew). The total crew losses were 36 people.
Duration of combat service - 2.2 months (June 22, 1941 - August 28, 1941). One combat campaign (18 days). Two torpedo attacks as a result of which 1 ship was possibly sunk and another ship was damaged.
The commander was: cap. Lt. Grachev I.V. (1941)
"Shch-302" ("Perch")
Laid down on February 5, 1930 in Leningrad at plant number 189, factory number 200. November 6, 1931 launched. On October 14, 1933, it became part of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. Participated in the Soviet-Finnish War.
On June 22, 1941, she met Pyotr Nikitich under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Dragenov as part of the Separate Submarine Training Division in Orienbaum. In August, captain-lieutenant Nechkin Vadim Dmitrievich was appointed commander of the ship. On September 22, while parked in Kronstadt, she received shrapnel damage to her durable hull.
On October 10, 1942, she left for operations on enemy communications. At 19.30 on October 10, supported by the Moscow cruise line, BTShch-207, -210, -215, -217, -218 and 3 SKA left Kronstadt to the island. Lavensari. At about 04.00 on October 11, she began an independent transition from the Lavensari area to the western area. Moonsund Islands (position No. 4). During the campaign she did not make contact (she did not report the completion of the crossing of the Gulf of Finland and the occupation of the position, did not respond to command calls on October 19 and 20) and did not return to base. At 01.40, 08.15 October 13 and on the night of October 14 Fin. the radio station broadcast messages about the sighting of owls. Submarines 8 and 9 miles north-west. m-Pakri (in both cases the message could refer to “S-13”, and in the latter to “Shch-311”). Possible causes of death: mine explosion of the barriers “Nashorn”, “Juminda” or “Seegel” (possibly on October 11, after which the heavily damaged boat was sunk in the northern island of Bolshaya Tyuters German Sam. (according to other sources - Finnish Sam "SB-10" of the Lelv-6 squadron, which dropped bombs on a moving oil trail), as well as a personnel error or equipment failure. 37 crew members died on the submarine.
The commanders were: Kosmin D.M. (1933), Potapov L.S. (1938), cap. Lt. Drachenov P.N. (1941), cap. Lieutenant Nechkin V.D. (1942)
"Shch"-303" ("Ruff")
Laid down on February 5, 1930 in Leningrad at plant No. 189 (Baltic Shipyard), serial number 201. November 6, 1931 launched. On November 25, 1933 it became part of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. Participated in the Soviet-Finnish War.
June 22, 1941 met under the command of senior lieutenant (later lieutenant commander, captain 3rd rank) Ivan Vasilyevich Travkin as part of the Separate Submarine Training Division in Orienbaum. From October 1939 to July 1941, a major overhaul took place in Leningrad at the Kronstadt Marine Plant. From the end of the summer of 1941 it was in an organizational period. On September 6 it moved to Leningrad, on September 17 - to Kronstadt, on September 28 - to Leningrad, on October 14 - to Kronstadt, on October 30 - to Leningrad.
July 4 - August 9, 1942 the first campaign in the Second World War. At 22.00 on July 4 - 14.46 on July 5 she independently went to Fr. Lavensari. At 23.12 on July 7, she reached the area of the island. Ute - m. Ristna (position No. 6, supporting - commander of the 3rd submarine, captain 2nd rank G.A. Goldberg). On the morning of July 8, due to a dead reckoning mismatch, she jumped onto a sandbank near Rodsher Cape, from which she successfully got off. On the night of July 10, in the area of Kalbodagrund, an enemy SKA was discovered and unsuccessfully attacked. At 00.50 on July 11th north. While charging, Tallinn was attacked by 2 ships, causing minor damage to the submarine. At 00.43 on July 12 southeast. The ship Porkkalan-Kallboda launched an OTR torpedo attack (TR-timber carrier 6-7000 tons, attack = above/pr/2, d = 15 cab., after 1 minute during the dive an explosion was heard - no foreign data). Corps that appeared in the attack area. The enemy carried out bombing from 07.30 to 22.30. On July 13, she crossed the Nashorn barrier (at the same time, she touched the spacecraft tube once - at 10.32, and also had one imaginary meeting with the Minrep), while continuing to be pursued by the cor. PLO. At 09.00 on July 15, she finished crossing the Gulf of Finland and headed to the position. Since the morning of July 16, I was in the area of \u200b\u200b. Utyo. At 18.35 on July 19, she launched a torpedo attack by KON (5 TR, 4 TSCH) (TR? t, attack = sub/pr/1, d = 25-35 cab., due to shallow water it was not possible to get closer, the torpedo sank before reaching goals - no foreign data). At 21.35 on July 20, she launched a torpedo attack by KON (2 TR, 2 TSCH) (TR 12000 t, attack = sub/vi/2, d = 2.5 cable, after 18 and 22 seconds we heard 2 explosions - at point 59°34 "3 N/21°30" E heavily damaged German TR "Aldebaran", 7891 GRT, transporting units for the 7th year (+1,=3) - maintained speed of 5 knots, arrived at base and repaired by 1944). Germ. TSC “M 1807”, “M 1806”, “M 1805” counterattacked the submarine, dropping 23 GB on it. Due to close explosions, the horizontal rudders on the boat jammed and at 21.40 it hit the ground hard (the stem was bent, the bow horizontal rudders were jammed, the hull in the bow was damaged). On the night of July 22, she moved to the Ristna metro area. In the afternoon of July 23, the submarine discovered the OTR, in the evening - a detachment of combat corks. During maneuvering, it turned out that the bow TA covers were jammed (the torpedoes in the stern TA were expended on July 12). At 01.14 on July 26, with the permission of the command, she began to retreat to the base. At 00.00 on July 28, the crossing of the Gulf of Finland began. At 18.49 and 19.45 on July 29, when crossing the barrier, the Nashorn twice touched the minereps and spacecraft tubes of the EMS mines - no explosions followed. On the afternoon of July 30, she was discovered underwater and attacked herself. enemy in the area of Kalbodagrund. In the evening of August 1, she arrived in Narva Bay, where she waited until 18.25 on August 6 to meet with the escort ships. Having arrived at the rendezvous point, she did not find her ships, but she noticed anti-submarine ship enemy. Only on August 3, the brigade headquarters received the radio and began to organize a meeting with the submarines. During this time, Shch-406 was twice discovered in the same area, and only the caution of its commander prevented a disaster. For various reasons, the escort ships could not arrive for the meeting, and on August 6, the submarine received orders, together with Shch-406, to proceed independently to the area of Lavensari Island. At 03.40 on August 6, she was attacked by enemy ships, which pursued her until 05.58. As a result of the bombing, the submarine's acoustic and radio equipment failed, and water entered the durable hull. At 01.30 on August 8, after a meeting with the SKA, the raid arrived. Lavensari. At 22.00 on August 8 - 04.57 on August 9, supporting BTShch-207, -210, -211 and 2 SKA moved to Kronstadt.
October 1 - November 13, 1942 Second campaign in the Second World War. At 19.55 on October 1, in support of BTShch-210, -211, -215, -217, -218 and 3 SKA reached the island. Lavepsari. Due to fog, at 03.30 on October 2, the escort anchored, and the submarine continued the passage on its own. At 04.06 arrived at the dive point 6 miles west. O. Lavensary and began moving to the area of Landsort Cape (northern part of position No. 11). At 17.40, while crossing the barrier, the Zseigel touched the mine, but there was no explosion. In the evening, several series of bombs exploded behind the stern of the submarine. At 11.53 on October 5, while crossing the obstacle, the Nashorn touched the spacecraft tube of the EMC mine - there was no explosion. At 00.35 on October 7, she completed crossing the Gulf of Finland. On the evening of October 8, she arrived in the area of Fr. Gotska-Sanden, on the night of October 10, passed to the Huvudsher monastery. On the afternoon of October 11, it twice refused attacks from the OTR, which were moving along skerry fairways. During October 12, it was unable to attack 4 OTR due to unfavorable command positions and shallow waters. On October 15-16, the boat stormed the position. At 00.03 on October 18, she launched a torpedo attack by KON (5 TR, 2 SKR) south. m-Landsort (TR 10-12000 t, attack = above/vi/2, d = 14 cab., after 1 min 36 sec I observed a large explosion, a column of fire and smoke. At the moment of the dive, the crew heard the explosion of the second torpedo - cut. No data). The submarine was not persecuted. At 15.26 on October 20, she launched an OTR torpedo attack (TR 8000 t, attack = sub/pr/2, d = 12 cable, after 2 minutes two explosions were heard - no foreign data). On October 21-22, the boat departed for the island. Gotska-Sanden for reloading TA and topping up AB. At 21.47 on November 2, she launched an OTR torpedo attack in conditions of a force 8 storm (TR? t, attack = above/pr/2, d = 15 cable, miss - no foreign data). At 23.42 on November 4, she launched a torpedo attack by KON (2 TR, 2 SKR) (TR 15000 tons, attack = above/vi/3, d = 10 cable, 2 explosions were heard - no foreign data). The submarine was not persecuted. At 19.53 on November 6, having informed the command that the ammunition had been used up, she began returning to base. On the morning of November 8, the crossing of the Gulf of Finland began. At 23.56 on November 11, while crossing the barrier, “Zseigel” touched the mine defender’s mine guard. At 09.00 on November 12, we met our SKA and at 11.00 arrived at the bay. Nørre-Kappellacht. At 01.10-09.45 on November 13, supported by 5 BTShch and 2 SKA, it moved to Kronstadt.
On March 1, 1943 she was awarded the title of Guards. From April 15, 1943, she was ready for a combat campaign.
May 7 - June 11, 1943 third campaign in the Second World War. At 22.30 on May 7 - 01.00 on May 8, in support of BTShch-210, -211, -215, -217, -218, 6 SKA and 2 KDZ, it moved from Kronstadt to the Shepelevsky meter, where it lay down on the ground, and on the night of 9 May moved to Fr. Lavensari. At 04.30 to the east. On the Lavepsar roadstead, BTShch-210 was blown up by 2 bottom mines and received serious damage. At 04.40 the submarine lay down on the ground 2 miles from the bay. Norre-Kappellaht and on the night of May 11 moored in the bay. At 23.00 on May 11, supported by 4 BTSC and 6 SKA, it reached the dive point (arrived at 01.29 on May 12) 6 miles southwest. O. Lavensari for further transition to a position at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland (Uto Island - Ristna Cape). Forced the Gogland PLO line in the area of the Namsi Bank. From the evening of May 13 to the morning of May 17, there was a west. O. Vaindlo charging the battery. At 02.00 on May 17, she transmitted a message about the breakthrough of the Gogland PLO line, which, due to violation of instructions, was not accepted by the UAV command. On the afternoon of May 17, she moved to the north-west region. Ms. Carey. On May 18, she was on the ground, correcting damage to the gyrocompass. On the afternoon of May 19, she continued moving west. At 04.38 6 miles north. O. Nayssar had a meeting with the Ministry of Repair at 18.15 in room 55. north-west m-Nayssar fell into an anti-submarine net, after which it retreated to the area of \u200b\u200bthe island. Carey to charge the battery (was in this area until June 1). At 15.47 on May 21, taking advantage of the absence of the watch officer, the bilge engineer sergeant Galkin locked himself in the central post and surfaced the submarine with the intention of surrendering. Sergeant major radio operators Alekseev and hydroacoustic specialist Mironenko, who were in the radio room of the central command center, scrubbed the doors. I.V., who climbed onto the bridge Travkin saw Galkin giving signals with a pillowcase to the nearby officers. enemy. The submarine made an urgent dive. Galkin remained on the surface and the germ was picked up. TFR. During the dive, the enemy SKA fired at the submarine, and then dropped approx. 100 GB. From 00.00 to 16.05 on May 22, another approx. 100 GB. When trying to charge the battery on the night of May 23, a SKA was discovered, which dropped 5 Gb onto the boat. On the night of May 25, the submarine interrupted battery charging several times due to detection of enemy SKA. At 00.05 and 01.45, the commander twice reported the decision to return to base. At 02.04 on May 26, the submarine commander reported a hit to the anti-submarine network (occurred on May 19), without indicating the date of the hit and his coordinates. At 01.20 on May 29, the submarine commander reported the coordinates of the submarine and the main events of the campaign, after which he received permission to return to base if a breakthrough into the Baltic Sea was impossible. On the morning of June 1, I moved to the Rodsher monastery area. On the night of June 2, the submarine reported a new location and requested information about the situation on the return route. On June 4 it moved to the Narva Hall, and on June 5 it crossed the Gogland PLO line. On the night of June 6, the submarine commander asked to organize a meeting with the southwest. O. Lavensari. The rendezvous on the night of June 7 did not take place, because upon hearing explosions (mines swept by boats exploded), the Shch-303 lay down on the ground. Of the SKA escort, MO No. 102 was killed by mines, and MO No. 123 was seriously damaged. At 23.19 on June 7, encountered 8 miles southwest. O. Lavensari 7 SKA and 4 TKA and at 03.30 on June 8 arrived at the bay. Nørre-Kappellacht. At 21.47 on June 9 - 02.29 on June 10, supported by 5 BTSH, 4 SKA, 4 BKA, 2 KDZ, moved to the place of laying on the ground near the Shepelevsky meter. At 01.25 on June 10, KON was hit by a Finn. Air Force, which lightly damaged BTShch-215 and heavily damaged BTShch-218 (landed on the ground in shallow water). At 00.22-03.10 on June 11, in support of 3 BTShch, 4 SKA and 2 BKA, it moved to Kronstadt.
From December 1943 - summer 1944 - major repairs at the Kronstadt Marine Plant. Until October 1944 she was engaged in combat training.
On October 3, 1944, when leaving the Merchant Harbor of Kronstadt for operations on enemy communications, it hit the wall, bending the bracket and the right propeller shaft, the fencing of the aft horizontal rudders and the vertical rudder stock. To repair the damage received, I went to the factory. She was under repair at the Kronstadt Marine Plant until November 23.
December 17, 1944 - January 4, 1945 Fourth campaign in the Second World War. On the morning of December 17, I went to the western area. Libavi (sector No. 1). Before Fr. Utyo (until the evening of December 17) was supporting BTShch-215. At 21.00 on December 20, she arrived at the position. On December 29, while attempting to attack the KON, it was discovered and pursued by PLO forces. On the morning of January 1, 1945, a cork was discovered and persecuted. PLO. During an urgent dive, she hit the ground twice, resulting in damage to the rudder, keel and hull. On the night of January 2, she began returning to base. At 19.00 on January 3, BTShch-215 was encountered in the area of the island. Nyhamn and at 23.10 on January 4 arrived in Turku.
February 24 - March 25, 1945 fifth military campaign in the Second World War. At 15.00 on February 24, supporting the LD and BTShch-217, it reached a position in the Libau region (position No. 1; supporting - commander of the 3rd submarine, captain 2nd rank G.A. Goldberg). At 00.00 on March 1, she arrived at the position, but due to the storm, the search for the cor. the enemy was not carried out until March 5. At 23.39 on March 5, she launched a torpedo attack by KON (2 TR, 1 MM, 1 SKR, 1 SKA) at point 56°18"5 N/19°56"E. (TR? t, attack = above/vi/2, d = 8-9 cable, miss - no foreign data). After the attack, the cor. was persecuted. PLOs that dropped 3 gigabytes. On the morning of March 6, I heard the movement of a large number of ships, but did not launch an attack due to strong anti-aircraft defense. On March 7-8, due to a storm, she lay on the ground. At 00.04 on March 9, she launched a torpedo attack by KON (3 TR or 2 TR and SKR) at point 56-21"5 N/20°10"0 E. (TR 6-7000 t, attack=nadv/vr/4, d=6 cable, a torpedo explosion was observed - no foreign data). In the evening, the UAV commander ordered the boat to take a position on the approaches to Danzig Bay. (positions No. 2, 3). On the evening of March 10, she arrived in the area of the Hel Peninsula. Boat actions in the underwater position were unmasked by the high noise of the mechanisms and the beating of the shaft line. On the morning of March 18, I heard the noises of an enemy submarine. During the day, she was unable to attack KON due to strong anti-aircraft defense. In the evening, the enemy's TFR and SKA were discovered, dropping approx. 20 GB. On March 21, the UAV commander ordered the boat to operate to the east. parts of the Danzig Bight. (position No. 2). On March 22, she was again persecuted by PLO forces, breaking away from them and moving to Hoborg Cape for observation. At 00.00 on March 24, due to depletion of supplies, she began returning to base. At 16.03 on March 25, the LD was met in the area of \u200b\u200bChekarsern and at 22.54 arrived in Turku.
On May 7, 1945 it was supposed to reach the southern position. O. Gotland with the aim of blockading Libau, but due to the imminent end of hostilities, the campaign was canceled.
On September 12, 1945, she was withdrawn from combat service and transferred to a detachment of training ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet for use for training purposes.
On February 15, 1946 it was part of the KVMK. On January 12, 1949, she was assigned to the subclass of medium submarines. On June 9, 1949, renamed S-303. On September 11, 1954, she was disarmed and expelled from the Navy due to delivery to the OFI for dismantling and sale. In 1961, at the Glavvtorchermet base on Turukhanny Islands in Leningrad, it was cut into metal.
Duration of combat service - 46.5 months (June 22, 41 - May 9, 1945). 5 military campaigns (157 days). 9 torpedo attacks as a result of which 2 ships (11857 GRT) were sunk and 1 ship was damaged, in addition, 3 more ships may have been damaged.
The commanders were: Art. l-t, cap. l-t, k. 3 r. Travkin I.V. (1941-1944), room 3 Vetchinikin P.P. (1944), volume 3 r. Filov N.A. (1944), cap. Lt Ignatiev E.A. (1944-1945).
"Shch-304" ("Komsomolets")
Serial number 550/1.
Laid down on February 23, 1930 at plant No. 112 “Krasnoye Sormovo” in Nizhny Novgorod with funds raised by workers. Funds for the construction of this ship came from all republics. A total of 2.5 million rubles were collected. The laying ceremony was attended by Deputy People's Commissar of Military Affairs and Chairman of the RVS S.S. Kamenev and Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee S.A. Saltanov. At this time, the appeal of the Komsomol Central Committee to the youth said: “On the day of the 12th anniversary of the Red Army, in order to strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet Union, the fatherland of the international proletariat, the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union, expressing the will of millions of Komsomol members, young proletarians and peasants, undertakes to before the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army to build one submarine for its 13th anniversary, calling it "Komsomolets". On the foundation board of the boat it was written: "The submarine "Komsomolets" was laid down during the period of the proletarian country's implementation of a grandiose plan for industrialization and socialist construction, during the period the brutal struggle of the working class under the leadership of the Communist Party with the capitalist element of the city and countryside for the socialist restructuring of the countryside, for collective farms and the socialization of agriculture. On May 2, 1931, she was launched, and then transferred via the Mariinsky water system in a transport dock to Leningrad to plant No. 189 (Baltic Shipyard) for completion and delivery to the fleet. On August 15, 1934 it became part of the Baltic Sea Naval Forces. Participated in the Soviet-Finnish War. On January 11, 1935, it became part of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.
June 22, 1941 met under the command of Lieutenant Commander (later Captain 3rd Rank) Afanasyev Yakov Pavlovich as part of the Submarine Training Brigade in Kronstadt.
From the end of the summer of 1941 it was in an organizational period. On September 6 it moved to Leningrad, on September 16 - to Kronstadt, on September 29 - to Leningrad, on October 14 - to Kronstadt.
October 21-November 10, 1941 the first military campaign in the Second World War. At 18.00 on October 21, she left for a hidden deployment near Fr. Gogland. Since the morning of October 30, I was with Fr. Lavensari. On November 10 she returned to Kronstadt. On November 11 she moved to Leningrad.
On the night of June 4, 1942, she moved to Kronstadt (she was fired upon by enemy artillery, which fired about 50 shells). Reaching the position was delayed due to the need to mine proximity mines in the Kronstadt area.
June 9-30, 1942 Second military campaign in the Second World War. At 22.00 on June 9, I left Kronstadt for Fr. Lavensari, accompanied by 4 SKA and 2 EMTSH (accompanied the submarine to the Sheielevsky settlement). At 09.02 on June 11, she arrived at Fr. Lavensari. At 21.19 on June 12, she left for action on the Tallinn - Helsinki communications (position No. 11). Patrolled from the morning of June 14 to June 27. On June 14, I discovered an OTR in the Helsinki area - it was walking along a skerry fairway. At 11.51 on June 15, she launched a torpedo attack on KON (1 TR, 5 SKA) (TR 10-12000 t, attack = sub/pr/2, d = 8-12 cable, after 48 seconds two explosions, at 11.55 did not detect TR - the KATSCH "MRS 12" submarine, which was providing trawling in the Porkalla-Udd area, was unsuccessfully attacked. At 01.02 on June 16, she discovered KON, but was unable to attack due to the poor training of the torpedoists. At 01.53 launched a torpedo attack on the OTR (TR 4000 t, attack = sub/pr/1, the second torpedo was not fired due to untimely preparation of the torpedo, d = 6 cab., miss - unsuccessfully attacked by PLB KATSCH "MRS 12"). After surfacing, while trying to get closer for an artillery attack, the KATSCH PLB opened fire on the submarine with 2 guns. The submarine sank and from 02.25 for several hours came under attack from the main submarine. At 23.39 I discovered KOH, from cor. whose protection was forced to leave to the north. On the morning of June 17, 2 Finns were attacked. SKA - dropped 8 GB. While charging on the night of June 18, the Finnish army was attacked. himself., and then SKA (chased the submarine until 08.40, dropped 21 gigabytes). On the afternoon of June 18, I examined Paldiski harbor. On the nights of June 19 and June 20, during charging, it was discovered and attacked by anti-aircraft forces. On the evening of June 20, a cor. was discovered and persecuted. enemy. During the dive, she hit an unmarked can or the hull of a sunken ship - water began to flow through the rivets, up to 1 ton per hour. Within 6 hours the damage was localized. Moved to the Helsinki area for action. On June 22, she was discovered and pursued by enemy ships. While charging the battery on the night of June 23, the battery itself was attacked. Ne-111, then SKA. Due to the impossibility of charging on the night of June 24, she retreated to the Kalbodagrund Bank area - the Finnish army was attacked. SKA. On the night of June 25, the submarine commander reported on the continuation of the pursuit and the impossibility of charging (during the voyage, the submarine was pursued for about 90 hours, attacked by surface ships 8 times (105 bombs), itself - 5 times (11 bombs). On the night of On June 28, by order of the command, she began returning to base. At 02.18 on June 30, she was met by 2 SKA and 9 KATSCH and arrived at Lavensari Island at 08.45. At 23.00 on June 30 - 08.33 on July 1, she moved to Kronstadt (accompanied by 3 SKA and 8 KATSCH).
23.00 August 22 - 06.50 August 23 moved to Fr. Lavensari in support of the Krasnoe Znamya CL, the Burya SKR, BTShch-204, -211, -217 and 4 SKA (by August 30 it was supposed to take a position in front of the Irbensky Strait and the Soelavain Strait - position No. 4). During the transition to the submarine, a serious diesel breakdown occurred, which made the continuation of the trip impossible. Until September 1st she was with Fr. Lavensari (lying on the ground during daylight hours). On the night of September 2, in support of BTShch-217, it moved to Kronstadt.
On October 27, 1942 she set out on her last combat campaign. At 19.30 on October 27 - 05.02 on October 28, in support of BTShch-205, -207, -210, -211, -215, 3 SKA moved to the island. Lavensari. At 00.05 on October 29, it reached a position between the east. coast of the island Gotland and the meridian 20 ° 30 "E (later, by additional order, it was supposed to move to a position at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland - position No. 5). On November 13, the boat received an order to return to base. During the voyage there was no contact left (did not report the completion of the crossing of the Gulf of Finland and the occupation of the position) and did not return to the base. Possible causes of death: mine explosion of the Seeigel, Juminda and Nashorn barriers, as well as a personnel error or equipment failure. The submarine killed 42 crew members. Some sources suggest that the submarine was lost to a mine not on October 29, 1942, but much later, already returning from a voyage, since, according to enemy data, its ships and vessels were attacked several times by a submarine in the area indicated "Shch-304", in the designated area on November 13, a Finnish minelayer was attacked four times by torpedoes, on November 17, the Hindenburg transport (7888 GRT) was sunk there and other transport was damaged, and in early December, possibly from torpedoes, several more ships were lost . It can be assumed that "Shch-304" operated until mid-December and died while returning to base. The lack of reports from the boat can be explained by the fact that its commander decided to maintain radio silence, or the radio equipment was out of order.
Duration of combat service - 17.6 months (June 22, 1941 - December 10, 1942). 2 military campaigns (64 days). 2 torpedo attacks in the first voyage, as a result of which 1 ship was possibly sunk; in addition, several more ships were sunk in the second voyage.
The commanders were: Bubnov K.M., Capt. l-t, k. 3 r. Afanasyev Ya.P. (1941-1942)
In July 1976, to expand the production of third-generation multi-purpose submarines, the military leadership decided to develop, based on the Gorky 945 project, a new, cheaper nuclear submarine, the main difference of which from the prototype was to be the use of steel instead of titanium alloys in the hull designs. Therefore, the development of the submarine, which received the number 971 ( code "Pike-B"), carried out the same TTZ, bypassing preliminary design.
A feature of the new nuclear submarine, the development of which was entrusted to SKV Malakhit (Leningrad), was a significant reduction in noise, which is approximately 5 times less compared to the most advanced Soviet second-generation torpedo boats. It was supposed to reach this level through the implementation of early developments of SKV designers in the field of increasing the stealth of boats (an ultra-low-noise nuclear submarine was developed at SKV in the 1970s), as well as research by specialists from the Central Research Institute named after. Krylova.
The efforts of the submarine's developers were crowned with success: the new nuclear-powered submarine surpassed the best American-made analogue - a multi-purpose submarine - in terms of stealth for the first time in the history of submarine shipbuilding of the USSR. nuclear submarine third generation type "Los Angeles".
The Project 971 submarine was equipped with powerful strike weapons that significantly exceeded (in terms of missile and torpedo ammunition, caliber and number of torpedo tubes) the potential of Soviet and foreign submarines of similar purposes. New submarine, like the ship of the 945th project, was intended to combat enemy ship groups and submarines. The boat can take part in special-purpose operations, carry out mine laying and conduct reconnaissance.
On September 13, 1977, the technical design of “Pike-B” was approved. However, it was later subjected to modifications caused by the need to increase the technological level of the SAC to the level of American submarines (the United States again took the lead in this area). On Los Angeles-class submarines (third generation), the AN/BQQ-5 sonar system was installed, which has digital information processing, ensuring more accurate identification of the useful signal against the background noise. Another new “introduction” that necessitated the need to make changes was the military’s requirement to install the Granat strategic missile defense system on the submarine.
During the modification (completed in 1980), the submarine received a new digital sonar system with improved characteristics, as well as a weapons control system that allows the use of Granat cruise missiles.
The decision to develop a mass series of third-generation multipurpose submarines in our country was made in July 1976. The design of the submarine was carried out by the design bureau SKB-143 (later SPMBM Malachite). Until 1997, the work was led by chief designer G.N. Chernyshev, after his death - Yu.I. Farafontov. The technical specifications were left the same as those of the Gorky project 945 “Barracuda”, and the design of the ship, which received project number 971 and the code “Shchuka-B”, was carried out on its basis, so work was not carried out at the preliminary design stage. Unlike the Barracuda, the boat's hull was supposed to be made not of titanium, but of steel. This proposal was made by shipbuilders from Komsomolsk-on-Amur. This requirement was due both to the shortage and high cost of titanium, and to the difficulties in working with it, which only one Russian enterprise, Sevmash, could overcome. At the same time, replacing titanium with steel made it possible to use the increased capacity of Far Eastern factories. On September 13, 1977, the technical design was approved, but due to the construction in the United States of a new type of Los Angeles submarine with a new generation of sonar systems, the Shchuka-B was sent for revision.
The improved project was ready by 1980. The first part of the series was built at a plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, which was very unusual, because in the construction of the submarine fleet, with the exception of the first generation Project 659, which was built only in the Far East, Pacific shipyards always played a leading role.
In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union purchased from the Japanese company Toshiba a batch of high-precision metal-cutting machines, which made it possible to use new technologies in the processing of propellers, which sharply reduced the noise of Soviet submarines. The deal was secret, but information about it reached the world press. As a result of the resulting scandal, the United States even imposed economic sanctions against the Japanese company.
A feature of the new Shchuka-B nuclear submarine was a significant (approximately five times compared to the most advanced domestic 2nd generation torpedo boat) reduction in noise level. This result was supposed to be achieved through the implementation of earlier developments in the field of increasing stealth of both the Malachite design team (where the ultra-low-noise nuclear submarine project was developed in the early 1970s) and the scientists of the Central Research Institute named after. Academician A.N. Krylova.
The efforts of the ship’s creators were crowned with success; in terms of stealth level, the new nuclear-powered submarine for the first time in the history of domestic submarine shipbuilding surpassed the best American analogue - the 3rd generation multi-purpose nuclear submarine Los Angeles.
The Project 971 submarine received powerful strike weapons, significantly superior (in the number and caliber of torpedo tubes, as well as missile and torpedo ammunition) to the potential of domestic and foreign submarines of similar purposes. Like the prototype, the new boat was supposed to fight enemy submarines and naval groups, carry out mine laying, conduct reconnaissance and participate in special-purpose operations.
The technical design of "Pike-B" was approved on September 13, 1977. However, later it underwent modifications caused by the need to “pull up” the technological level of the hydroacoustic complex to the level of the Americans, who had once again taken the lead in this area. Their 3rd generation boats (Los Angeles type) were equipped with the AN/BQQ-5 sonar system with digital information processing, which ensured a much more accurate selection of the useful signal from the background noise. Another new “introduction” that necessitated the need to make changes to the project was the requirement of the military to equip new generation nuclear submarines with Granat strategic cruise missiles.
During the modification, which was completed in 1980, the boat received a new digital sonar system with improved characteristics, “Skat-3,” as well as a weapons control system that allows the use of cruise missiles. The design of the Project 971 nuclear submarine included such innovative solutions as integrated automation of combat and technical means, concentration of control of the ship, its weapons and armament in a single center - the main command post(GKP), the use of a pop-up rescue chamber for the entire crew (which was successfully tested on titanium boats of the 705 project).
The submarine pr. 971 has a classic double-hull design. The durable body is made of high quality alloy steel. To simplify the installation of equipment, the boat was designed using zone blocks, which made it possible to transfer a significant amount of work from the cramped conditions of the submarine compartments directly to the workshop. After installation is completed, the zone unit is “rolled” into the boat’s hull and connected to the main cables and pipelines of the ship’s systems. A two-stage shock absorption system is used: all mechanisms are placed on shock-absorbed foundations, in addition, each zone block is isolated from the body by rubber-cord pneumatic shock absorbers, forming a second cascade of vibration isolation. In addition to reducing the overall noise of the nuclear submarine, this scheme makes it possible to reduce the impact of underwater explosions on equipment and crew. The boat has a developed vertical tail unit with a streamlined boule, which houses a towed hydroacoustic station antenna. A special feature of the project is the smoothly coupled connection of the tail unit with the body. This is done to reduce hydrodynamic turbulence, which creates additional noise.
The ship's displacement was: surface 8140 tons, underwater 10500 tons. Maximum length 110.3 m, width 13.6 m, average draft 9.68 m.
Due to the introduction of comprehensive automation, the boat’s crew was reduced to 73 people (including 31 officers), which is almost double fewer in number crew of the American Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine (141 people). Compared to the nuclear submarine of the previous project 671RTM "Pike", the new ship's habitability conditions were also improved. The entire crew is housed in the 2nd living compartment in cabins. In the remaining compartments, personnel stand watch and perform their official duties.
The ship's power plant includes one pressurized water reactor with a power of 190 MW with four steam generators and a steam single-shaft block steam turbine plant with extensive redundancy of mechanization. Shaft power – 50,000 l. With.
The boat is equipped with a seven-bladed propeller with improved hydroacoustic characteristics and a reduced rotation speed. The full underwater speed is 33 knots, i.e. The submarine, if desired, can rush underwater at speeds of over 60 km/h!
The hydroacoustic complex MGK-540 "Skat-3" with a digital information processing system has a powerful noise direction finding and sonar system. The target detection range using the new complex has increased threefold compared to the GAS installed on 2nd generation boats. The time required to determine target motion parameters has also been significantly reduced.
In addition to hydroacoustic systems, Project 971 nuclear submarines are equipped with a highly effective system for detecting enemy submarines and surface ships using their wake, which has no analogues in the world. The equipment installed on the boat makes it possible to record such a trace in the ocean environment many hours after the passage of an enemy submarine.
The missile-torpedo system includes four torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber and four 650 mm torpedo tubes, the total ammunition load is more than 40 units of weapons, including 28 of 533 mm caliber. It is equipped to fire Granat cruise missiles, underwater missiles and missile-torpedoes (Shkval, Vodopad and Veter), as well as torpedoes and self-transporting mines. In addition, the boat can lay conventional mines. The firing of Granat cruise missiles is controlled by a special hardware complex.
However, on the basis of the Soviet-American agreements of 1989, weapons systems with nuclear equipment were excluded from the armament of multi-purpose nuclear submarines - that is, the Shkval and Vodopad missile-torpedoes, as well as the Granat-type missile-torpedoes.
Shchuka-B became the first type of multi-purpose nuclear submarine, serial construction of which was initially organized at a plant in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and not in Severodvinsk or Leningrad, which indicated an increased level of development of shipbuilding in the Far East. The lead nuclear-powered vessel of Project 971, K-284, was laid down on the banks of the Amur in 1980 and entered service on December 30, 1984.
Already during its testing, the achievement of a qualitatively higher level of acoustic stealth was demonstrated. The noise level of the K-284 was 12–15 dB (that is, 4–4.5 times) lower than the noise level of the “quiest” domestic boat of the previous generation - Project 671RTM, which gave reason to talk about our country becoming a world leader in this most important indicator of submarine shipbuilding. In the West, the new Soviet submarines were quickly classified as next-generation submarines and given the code "Akula".
High stealth and combat stability give Project 971 boats the ability to successfully overcome anti-submarine lines equipped with stationary long-range hydroacoustic surveillance systems, as well as counter anti-submarine forces. They can operate in the enemy’s zone of dominance and deliver sensitive missile and torpedo strikes. The armament of Project 971 ships allows them to fight submarines and surface ships, as well as hit ground targets with high precision with strategic cruise missiles.
The appearance of ships with such a high combat potential changed the situation and forced the US Navy to reckon with the possibility of serious opposition from the Russian fleet even in conditions of complete superiority of American offensive forces. Project 971 submarines can attack both the strike forces of the US Navy themselves and their rear areas, including coastal control centers, basing and supply points, no matter how far away they are. Secretive and therefore inaccessible to the enemy, Project 971 nuclear submarines turn a potential war on the oceans into a kind of attack through a minefield, where any attempt to move forward threatens with an invisible but real danger.
The appearance of new super-stealthy nuclear-powered ships in the Russian fleet after the end of the Cold War caused serious concern in the United States. In 1991, this issue was raised in Congress. Several proposals were put forward for discussion by American legislators aimed at rectifying the current situation in favor of the United States. In accordance with them, it was assumed, in particular:
Demand that our country publicize its long-term programs in the field of submarine shipbuilding;
Establish for the Russian Federation and the United States agreed restrictions on the quantitative composition of multi-purpose nuclear submarines;
Provide assistance to Russia in re-equipping shipyards building nuclear submarines to produce non-military products.
As they say, comments are unnecessary.
Later, Project 971 was improved several times: the Leopard, Tiger and Walrus submarines were created with improved acoustic stealth. But the subsequent boats “Vepr” and “Dragon” were built according to the significantly improved project 971U. These submarines have slightly modified external contours due to an additional insert that lengthened the hull by 4 meters, from 110.3 m to 114.3 m, and allowed for additional avionics and equipment to actively suppress noise and vibration from the power plant. The displacement increased from 8140/10500 tons to 9830/12390 tons. The boats also received a new modification of the reactor - OK-650B3. In some Western publications they were even given the code “Improved Akula”. According to project 971U, “Nerpa”, “Cheetah”, “Lynx” and “Cougar” were also to be built. But the K-335 “Gepard” was built according to the newly created modernized project 971M, which became the embodiment of the latest technical achievements. Western experts dubbed them “Akula II,” quite rightly noting significant changes compared to the basic version. The K-152 Nerpa submarine was completed according to a special project 971I for lease to the Indian Navy. Modification 971I was created on the basis of 971U and differs mainly in the export, unclassified version of radio-electronic equipment.
Initially, all Shchuki-Bs, traditionally for the Navy, carried only tactical numbers, but on October 10, 1990, Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy V.N. Chernavin issued a decree naming the K-317 the name “Panther” in honor of the submarine that opened the combat account of Russian submariners in 1919. Subsequently, all boats received proper names, echoing the names of pre-revolutionary Russian submarines. “Pike-B”, produced at Sevmash, received the names of “Bars” type boats, which were the most successful and numerous series of Russian submarines of the early 20th century. For these names, Project 971 was nicknamed the “cat series” in the navy.
During the military action of US troops in Serbia in 1996, the submarine K-461 "Wolf" carried out combat service in the Mediterranean Sea. It was discovered by NATO anti-submarine services while passing Gibraltar, but after some time contact with the boat was lost, and it was discovered only off the coast of Yugoslavia. "Wolf" protected the TAVKR "Admiral Kuznetsov" from potential enemy submarines. During its combat service, it monitored several NATO submarines, including the American Los Angeles-class attack submarine.
In the same year, another “Shchuka-B” with a crew under the command of Captain 1st Rank A.V. Burilicheva, while on combat duty in the far reaches of the Atlantic, discovered a US Navy SSBN and secretly watched it go on combat patrol. Of course, in the event of hostilities, the unsuspecting American missile carrier would be immediately destroyed. After that campaign, the crew commander was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.
Project 971 belongs to the third generation of submarines, the main features of which are reduced noise levels and improved detection means. In comparison with other third-generation boats, Shchuka-B is superior to all similar projects in both stealth and armament. Some experts compare “Pike-B” not with its direct competitor - the American project “Improved Los Angeles”, but with the much more advanced projects “Seawolf” and “Virginia”. Thus, Admiral J. Burda, who was the chief of the operational headquarters of the US Navy in 1994–1996, noted that American ships were unable to detect the Pike-B, traveling at a speed of 6-9 knots, that is, due to the low noise level of the Project 971 boat, it was actually correspond to the parameters of fourth generation boats. The “Cat Series” is capable of undetectedly overcoming the SOSUS submarine detection system, which at one time created many problems for Soviet submariners.
February 29, 1996 occurred unprecedented case. During NATO fleet exercises, after a successfully completed mission to detect mock enemy submarines, a previously undetected Russian submarine suddenly contacted British ships. And soon, right in the middle of the order of NATO ships, a submarine surfaced, identified by British sailors as Project 971 “Pike-B”. According to its commander, one of the boat’s crew members needed urgent medical attention due to an acute attack of appendicitis, for which a decision was made to receive help from Western colleagues. The sick submariner was taken to the British destroyer Glasgow, and from there he was sent to the hospital by a Lynx helicopter. The British press covered the incident widely, with The Times noting that it was a dramatic demonstration of the stealth of Russian submarines. But the most important thing is that the British sailors were mistaken then: in front of them was the “Pike” of Project 671RTMK (that is, a boat of generation 2+), and not the “Pike-B”!
All completed Project 971 boats, except three, are in service and are part of the Northern and Pacific Fleet based at Yagelnaya Bay (SF) and in the village of Rybachy (Pacific Fleet). Construction of two of the four unfinished boats of the plant named after. Lenin Komsomol was canceled in the early stages of readiness, the third boat, K-152 “Nerpa”, was launched and in 2008 it was leased to the Indian Navy for a period of 10 years (). Interestingly, in the Indian Navy the Nerpa was named Chakra. Previously, this name was borne by the Soviet submarine K-43 of project 670 "Scat", which was part of the Indian fleet on leasing terms in 1988-1992 and over the years became a good base for training Indian submariners: many sailors who served on the first "Chakra" subsequently occupied important positions in the country's navy, including eight who rose to the rank of admiral.
Currently, all multi-purpose nuclear submarines of the 971st project are part of the Northern and Pacific fleets. They are quite actively used for combat service.
