Air France Air Crash Investigations 447. The cause of the Atlantic plane crash was “something sudden and powerful.” Flight recorder data

Airline Departure point Destination Flight AF447 Board number F-GZCP Date of issue February 25, 2005 (first flight) Passengers 216 Crew 12 Survivors 0 Media files on Wikimedia Commons

A330 crash in Atlantic- a major aviation accident that occurred on June 1, 2009. The Airbus A330-203 airliner of Air France operated flight AF447 on the route Rio de Janeiro - Paris, but 3 hours and 45 minutes after takeoff it crashed into the waters of the Atlantic Ocean and was completely destroyed. All 228 people on board were killed - 12 crew members and 216 passengers.

This is the largest disaster in the history of Air France and the largest crash of a passenger plane since 2001 until the Boeing 777 crash in the Donetsk region (July 17, 2014, 298 dead).

The final report of the investigation into the causes of the disaster was released at a press conference on July 5, 2012.

As the causes of the disaster, it indicates freezing of the pitot tubes, the subsequent shutdown of the autopilot and uncoordinated actions of the crew, which led to a stall, from which the crew was unable to recover the plane.

Flight 447 Details

Airplane

Airbus A330-203 (registration number F-GZCP, serial 660) was released in 2005 (first flight on February 25). On April 18 of the same year it was transferred to Air France. Equipped with two General Electric CF6-80-E1A3 turbofan engines. On December 27, 2008, February 21, 2009, and April 16, 2009, the aircraft underwent scheduled repairs, and no problems were found. On the day of the disaster, the airliner had completed 2,644 takeoff-landing cycles and had flown over 18,870 hours.

Crew and passengers

The aircraft was flown by a crew consisting of:

According to Air France, there were citizens of 33 countries on board the airliner. The crew included 3 pilots, 3 chief stewards and 6 stewards and stewardesses. All crew members are French, except for one Brazilian stewardess.

Among the 216 passengers were 126 men, 82 women, 7 children and one infant.

The plane was almost completely filled - 3 passenger seats out of 219 remained free.

Among the passengers were a number of famous people:

On board flight 447 was a Russian businessman, resident of the Moscow region, Andrei Kiselyov.

In total, there were 228 people on board the plane - 12 crew members and 216 passengers.

Chronology of events

Airplane disappearance

Flight AF447 took off from Rio de Janeiro to Paris at 23:29. After 2.5 hours, the pilots reported turbulence, then the aircraft’s on-board computer transmitted several service messages, after which contact with the aircraft was lost.

On the afternoon of June 1, Air France representatives said that there was practically no chance of finding the plane intact, and by the end of the day it was announced that the plane had crashed.

Another 14 bodies were found during the day, bringing the total to 16. Air France says it is replacing pitot tubes on all Airbus planes on the assumption that defective older-type sensors may have caused the crash.

June 8

A Brazilian search team retrieves part of a vertical tail fin painted in Air France colors from the ocean. The Brazilian Navy reports that about a hundred objects were found in the crash area, including seats and oxygen masks with the Air France logo.

the 9th of June

Brazilian officials say a total of 41 bodies have been found. The first 16 bodies found over the weekend will arrive at the rescue base in Fernando de Noronha, located off the coast of Brazil. The remaining 25 will be delivered later.

June 10th

The French nuclear submarine Emeraude, equipped with high-precision sonar, reaches the disaster site to begin searching for the black boxes.

Search operation

year 2009

The search operation was launched several hours after contact with flight AF447 was lost. Bad weather at the supposed site of the disaster greatly hampered the search.

2011

Investigation

Before the discovery and decoding of flight recorders, the only data on the condition of the aircraft before the disaster were automatic messages transmitted by the airliner. There was no objective control data, since the airliner was outside the radar coverage area at the time of the disaster.

The first results of the investigation into the crash of flight AF447 indicated that the airliner did not collapse in the air, as previously thought, but after hitting the water. This preliminary conclusion was made by experts from the French Bureau of Investigation and Analysis of Civil Aviation Safety (BEA), which published a report on July 2, 2009. According to him, the plane fell into the water " with significant vertical acceleration».

On March 17, 2011, French authorities announced that they were launching an investigation into the European aviation concern Airbus on suspicion of manslaughter.

On May 16, 2011, it was reported that BEA had succeeded in copying all data from the parametric recorder. BEA officials, who were investigating the cause of the crash, also managed to obtain recordings of the last two hours of the flight from the voice recorder. All collected data was sent to the BEA for thorough analysis.

Flight recorder data

The report provides flight data recorded by parametric and voice recorders. At 01:55 the crew commander woke up the co-pilot and said: […] he will take my place. After the briefing, at 02:01:46, the commander left the cockpit and went to rest. The co-pilot sat in the commander's seat, the trainee co-pilot sat in the right seat. At 02:06, the co-pilot warned the flight attendant team that the plane was entering an area of ​​turbulence. After 4 minutes, the pilots performed a slight left turn and reduced speed from 872 km/h to 400 km/h due to increasing turbulence.

At 02:10:05 the autopilot and autothrottle switched off. The co-pilot pushed the stick to the left and down, countering the right roll. The stall warning sounded twice. After 10 seconds, the plane's speed dropped sharply from 398 to 111 km/h. The angle of attack of the aircraft increased and the altitude began to rise. The left side of the instrument panel displayed a sharp increase in the indicated speed - up to 398 km/h. The integrated backup instrumentation system did not display this change for a minute (the readings on the right side of the instrument panel are not recorded by the parametric recorder). The trainee co-pilot continued to keep the nose of the aircraft up. The angle of the horizontal tail stabilizer increased from 3° to 13° within one minute and remained in this position until the end of the flight.

At approximately 02:11, the plane reached its maximum flight altitude of 11,600 meters. In this case, the angle of attack reached 16°, the engine control levers (EC) were moved to the “ Takeoff/Go-Around"(maximum thrust). At 02:11:40 the PIC returned to the cockpit. The angle of attack increased to 40°, the aircraft descended to an altitude of 10,675 meters with almost 100% engine thrust (the revolutions of the front engine fan, which creates most of the thrust in turbofan engines, are recorded). The stall warning is disabled because the indicated airspeed is considered unreliable at this angle of attack. Approximately 20 seconds later, the co-pilot reduced the pitch angle slightly, the indicated airspeed became valid, and the stall alarm sounded again. From this moment until the end of the flight, the pitch angle was not less than 35°. In the last minutes of the flight, the throttles were in the “low throttle” position (minimum thrust). The engines continued to operate and remained completely under the control of the crew.

The recording of both recorders ends at 02:14:28 or 3 hours 45 minutes after takeoff. At this moment, the aircraft speed was 198 km/h with a vertical speed of about 3345 m/min, the engine thrust was 55% of the maximum. The pitch angle was 16.2° (nose up), with a left bank of 5.3°. During the descent, the plane turned almost 180° to the right on a course of 270°. The airliner was in a stall for 3 minutes 30 seconds, falling from a height of 11,600 meters.

Incorrect airspeed readings are an obvious cause of autopilot disengagement, but why pilots lose control of the airplane remains a mystery, especially since the pilot typically tries to lower the nose of the airplane to prevent a stall. Multiple sensors show the pitch angle and there is no sign of any malfunction.

BEA Third Interim Report

The third report stated that some new facts had been established, in particular:

BEA organized a team of aviation specialists and doctors to analyze the pilots' response to the current situation.

Air France published a bulletin in which it stated that " misleading stall warning signals on and off, contradicting the actual attitude of the aircraft, could be factors that significantly complicate the crew's analysis of the situation» .

BEA Investigation Final Report

It confirmed the findings of previous reports, noted additional details and added recommendations to improve aviation security. According to the findings of the final report, the disaster occurred as a result of the following main events:

  • Temporary desynchronization of speed readings, most likely as a result of pitot tubes being clogged with ice crystals, which led to the autopilot being turned off and switching to an alternative piloting law (English).
  • The crew made inappropriate control actions, which led to the departure from stable flight.
  • The crew did not perform the actions prescribed in the event of loss of current speed readings.
  • The crew was late in determining and correcting the deviation from the specified flight mode.
  • The crew did not have sufficient skills to determine when a stall was approaching.
  • The crew was unable to determine the beginning of the stall and therefore did not take action to recover the aircraft from the stall.

These events were the result of a combination of the following main factors:

  • Feedback mechanisms in the controls involved made it impossible to identify and correct repeated failures to follow procedures for loss of current speed readings and pitot tube icing and its consequences.
  • The crew did not have practical skills in manually controlling the aircraft either at high flight altitudes or in the event of a discrepancy in the current speed readings.
  • The joint performance of the duties of the two pilots was complicated both by a lack of understanding of the situation at the time the autopilot was turned off, and by an inappropriate reaction to the effect of surprise, which led them to a state of emotional stress.
  • There was no clear indication in the cockpit of the discrepancy in the current speed readings recorded by the on-board computers.
  • The crew did not respond to the stall warning due to the short duration of the stall warning, which may have appeared to be a false alarm; with a lack of visual information confirming that the aircraft is approaching a stall after losing speed; with readings from the main computer, which could confirm the crew’s erroneous understanding of the situation; not recognizing the sound signal; mistaking buffeting during a stall for buffeting associated with exceeding the maximum speed; or having difficulty identifying and understanding the features of the transition to an alternative aircraft control law that does not provide protection in the angle of attack channel.
  • I'm trying to figure out what else you can do on the controls... On the flight displays and so on. 02:13:39 2P Climb, climb, climb, climb. Dial, dial, dial, dial. 02:13:40 2P-S But I’ve been at maxi nose-up for a while… But I keep the control stick fully to myself all this time... 02:13:42 PIC No, no, no! Don't climb! No no no! Don't dial anymore! 02:13:45 2P So. Give me the controls, the controls to me, controls to me. Fine. Give me control, give me control, give me control. 02:14:05 PIC Watch out! You're pitching up there. Carefully! You're pulling on yourself. 02:14:06 2P I'm pitching up? Am I pushing myself? 02:14:07 2P-S Well. We need to we are at four thousand feet. Well, it must be. We're at 4000 feet. . In their opinion, the main causes of the disaster were the following factors:
    • Inconsistency of actions and poor training of the crew (co-pilots David Robert and Pierre-Cedric Bonin, who were in the cockpit). For three minutes, while the emergency situation was developing, the pilots could not come to a common opinion about the spatial position and direction of movement of the aircraft.
    • Panic in the cockpit. More than a minute before the commander arrived, the two pilots took chaotic and uncoordinated actions, which transferred the situation from an emergency to an emergency. The required report to the commander about the situation in the cockpit was not made.
    • The trainee co-pilot Pierre-Cedric Bonin, who was in the right seat, committed a gross violation of the crew resource management procedure (). At the first sign of a malfunction, he panicked and pulled the control stick towards himself, without informing either co-pilot David Robert, who occupied the PIC seat, or commander Mark Dubois, who arrived a minute later. He reported his actions only a few seconds before the plane crashed into the water. The crew commander immediately made the right decision and ordered to stop attempting to climb; the co-pilot demanded that control be transferred to him. At an altitude of about 600 meters, the plane began to pick up speed, but it was not possible to stop the stall in time.

    According to the publication, the plane remained operational and under control the entire time before the collision with water. The authors of the article placed all the blame for the disaster on the inexperienced trainee co-pilot Pierre-Cedric Bonin.

    Chesley Sullenberger, chairman of the International Civil Airline Pilots Association, believes that in this case there is a systemic flaw in the design of modern aircraft and the crew training system. In his opinion, modern computer systems control the aircraft 99% of the time, which deprives pilots of direct piloting experience and reduces their preparedness for emergency situations.

    In addition, several documentaries and programs were broadcast that put forward various alternative versions of the disaster, but all of them lost relevance after the discovery of the flight recorders.

    The Air France pilots' union said pitot tubes played a decisive role in the crash. Union President Gérer Arnoux confirmed that the disaster could have been avoided if only they had been replaced in time.

    Cultural aspects

    Air France Flight 447 crash featured in season 12 of Canadian documentary series

October 04, 2011 No comments


Today, Air France is recognized as one of the most profitable international companies. True, 2011 was not the most successful year for her. Recently, it was for this reason that the airline changed its management, in the hope that, against the backdrop of the international financial crisis, the new management would be able to raise the company's prestige to maximum heights.

The fact that at the moment Air France is not in the most successful situation is also to blame for the Air France plane crashes that have recently occurred with the company's aircraft. Suffice it to recall the sensational crash over the Atlantic Ocean of the flight Rio de Janeiro - Paris in June 2009, in which 228 people died at once. The reasons for the plane crash were made public only in 2011.

Despite the disasters of Air France, in the fall of 2012 in Geneva the company entered the international ranking of the safest airlines in the world. According to the compilers of the list, in this situation, carriers were assessed based on a large number of parameters. Among the determining factors were the homogeneity of the fleet and the age of the aircraft used during flights. In total, the list includes 15 technical criteria, showing the technical level that ensures the company’s activities and how confident its aircraft feel in the sky.

True, not all analysts agree with the list compiled. Since, from the point of view of many experts, one cannot consider how well a company operates and how safe it is based solely on technical characteristics. The level of pilots working in the company plays too large a role in the activities of any operator. The so-called human factor plays too big a role in flights. The activities of European airlines in the proposed list were not assessed based on these parameters.

On April 20, 1998, Air France flight AF422 flew from Bogota to Quito. There were 10 crew members and 43 passengers on board. It was raining in Bogota, the sky was covered with cumulus clouds 700 meters high, and a moderate westerly wind was blowing. The Boeing took off from Runway 13L and began to exit the airport airside according to GIR 1, according to which it was supposed to turn 90° towards the Romeo radio beacon.
However, at the required point the crew did not turn and continued to fly in a straight line to the east until, 10 kilometers from the airport, it crashed into the 3.1-kilometer-high mountain Cerro el Cable. On impact, the plane was completely destroyed, killing all 53 people on board.
The cause of the disaster was the disorientation of the crew, as a result of which they could not withstand the exit pattern of GIR 1, continuing to maintain the flight direction until they collided with the mountains.

On July 25, 2000, the supersonic passenger airliner Aérospatiale-BAC Concorde 101 of Air France was operating charter flight AFR 4590 on the Paris-New York route, but while accelerating along the runway, the left engine of the plane caught fire. The crew lifted the burning plane into the air to then make an emergency landing, but 2 minutes after takeoff the plane crashed onto a hotel building in the Paris municipality of Gonesse, 4 kilometers southwest of Paris airport. All 109 people on board (100 passengers and 9 crew members), as well as 4 people on the ground, were killed.
This was the first and only Concorde disaster in 27 years of operation.

On August 2, 2005, an Air France Airbus A340-313X was operating scheduled flight AFR358 on the Paris-Toronto route, with 12 crew members and 297 passengers on board. The approach was carried out in difficult weather conditions with large thunderstorms over the airport in heavy rain and lightning flashes on the runway. The landing was carried out manually with the autopilot and autothrottle disabled, and as a result the plane ended up above the glide path.
Having flown over the end of the runway significantly higher than set, the airliner landed more than a third from the beginning of the runway length. The pilots applied reverse, but were unable to stop within the runway, as a result of which the plane left the runway and rolled into a ravine. A fire broke out, which in a few minutes engulfed the airliner and destroyed it, but all 309 people on board were evacuated in time.

Unfortunately, there is no longer any doubt that another major plane crash has occurred, in which more than 200 people died.

The passenger airliner of the French airline Air France, flight AF 447, carrying 216 passengers, took off from Rio de Janeiro to Paris on Sunday evening at 19.00 local time (02.00 Moscow time). Eleven hours later it was supposed to land in the French capital, but instead it disappeared from radar screens and disappeared over the expanses of the Atlantic Ocean, writes RIA News.

The Brazilian Air Force immediately began searching for the plane, but so far their efforts have yielded no results. According to experts, search operations can take from several hours to two weeks, and among the preliminary reasons that caused the disappearance of the airliner, they name strong turbulence, which led to malfunctions in the instruments. Meanwhile, the French side does not exclude the worst-case scenario for the development of the situation and the fact that a possible disaster will become the largest in the history of the airline.

The A-330 began operation in 2005 and has flown about 19 thousand hours, with an experienced pilot at the helm, and on board 216 passengers - 126 men, 82 women and eight children, as well as 12 crew members.

Flight AF 447 last made radio contact 565 kilometers off the coast of Brazil, at the entrance to airspace controlled by Senegal. At the time of leaving the coverage area of ​​Brazilian radars on the Fernando de Noronha archipelago, at 22.48 (05.48 Moscow time), the flight parameters corresponded to the norm: the plane was at an altitude of 35 thousand feet (11 kilometers) and moving at a speed of 840 kilometers per hour. After some time, he found himself in a thunderstorm zone with severe turbulence, and then sent an automatic signal about an emergency in the electrical system.

Air France reported that 100 kilometers before entering the Dakar (Senegal) air traffic control zone, flight AF 447 encountered technical problems - "loss of cabin pressure and electrical failure."

In search of the missing Airbus, Brazilian Air Force planes almost immediately took off from the island of Fernando de Noronha, located in the Atlantic 350 kilometers from the northeastern coast of Brazil, and they were joined by a military plane that took off from the French base in Dakar (Senegal).

Due to scattered information about the alleged crash site of the airliner, the search area is very wide: from the Fernando de Noronha archipelago, 270 kilometers northeast of the coast of Brazil, to the islands of Cape Verde, 500 kilometers west of the coast of Senegal.

Meanwhile, relatives of the passengers of the plane that disappeared over the Atlantic are gathering at Tom Jobim International Airports in Rio de Janeiro and the anti-crisis headquarters deployed at Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport. French President Nicolas Sarkozy not only sent two ministers to the Paris airport, but he himself will personally arrive at his headquarters on Monday.

According to Air France, there were 61 French, 58 Brazilians and 26 Germans on the plane. As noted in the Air France communique, Air France flight AF 447 also flew nine Italians, nine Chinese, six Swiss, five British, five Lebanese, four Hungarians, three each Irish, Norwegian and Slovak, two citizens of the USA, Spain, Morocco and Poland and one citizen each from South Africa, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Gambia, Iceland, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Romania, Sweden and Turkey.

A representative of the Russian embassy in Paris told RIA Novosti that a passenger named Andrei Kiselev, who is most likely a Russian citizen, is on board the missing airliner over the Atlantic.

The governor of Rio de Janeiro, Sergio Cabral, declared three days of mourning in the state.

A French Navy ship did not find the wreckage of an Airbus A330-200 that went missing the day before in the area indicated by the Brazilian pilots, a source in the Brazilian Air Force told reporters on Tuesday.

According to him, the search vessel found no traces of the plane crash in the territorial waters of Senegal, where, according to the pilots of the Brazilian airline TAM flight, shortly after losing contact with flight AF 447, flashes of orange color were noticed on the surface of the ocean.

The search and rescue operation in the Atlantic Ocean involves five aircraft and two helicopters from the Brazilian Air Force. A frigate, a corvette and a patrol ship from the country's navy entered the search area 597 nautical miles (1,100 km) northeast of the coast of Brazil. They are expected to arrive at their target location on Wednesday morning. The governments of France and the United States promised assistance to the Brazilian authorities in conducting the search operation.

It happened due to a lack of understanding by the crew of the situation and a violation of the aircraft’s operating conditions, said the director of the French Bureau of Air Accident Investigation (BEA), Jean-Paul Troadec, who announced the final report on the causes of the crash on Thursday.

Air France flight AF447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris. There were 228 people on board, all of them died. The French Bureau of Air Accident Investigation (BEA) reported in May 2011 that specialists were able to extract all the data from the plane’s flight recorders, which had lain on the ocean floor at a depth of 3.9 kilometers for about two years.

“This disaster was the result of a deviation from the operating mode of the aircraft by the crew, who lost their awareness of the situation. This category of accidents has been the deadliest in public transport for about 10 years. It affects both classic aircraft and modern models, both Boeing and Airbus,” Troadek told reporters.

He noted that the investigation into the cause of the crash had been completed.

"Starting tomorrow, the BEA will issue new recommendations (to airlines and aviation safety agencies), including eight on pilot training and five on aircraft certification. Some actions are already being taken; other recommendations may take years to implement. BEA will monitor implementation recommendations," said the director of the Bureau.

In turn, the head of the investigation, Alain Bouillard, said that the BEA had prepared 25 new recommendations.

"Pilots need to become more familiar with the design of aircraft and how performance changes when the situation deteriorates during flight. Practical and theoretical training, basic and technical knowledge of the aircraft and flight mechanics, as well as crew interaction in situations of high emotional stress need to be improved," Bouillard said.

According to the Bureau, problems during the flight from Rio de Janeiro began after ice crystals disrupted the Pitot's speed sensors. Due to a discrepancy between the measured speeds, the autopilot was disabled. At this moment, the commander of the ship was resting, the co-pilot took control, whose actions led the plane to a stall, from which no one recovered the aircraft.

"Twenty seconds after disabling the autopilot, the third pilot discovered that the aircraft was climbing. He asked the acting pilot to stabilize the trajectory, be attentive to the speed and descend back. Although no exact instructions were given, this would be enough to stabilize the situation in the short term," Bouillard said .

The plane rose to an altitude of 38 thousand feet (11.6 thousand meters) with a vertical speed of 6 thousand feet per minute (1.8 thousand meters). According to Brouillard, the co-pilot acted abruptly and without restraint, increasing the pitch angle from 0% to 10% in 10 seconds, whereas at such altitudes the maximum allowable angle is 6%.

“At that moment the maximum altitude was reached and a stall warning sounded,” the expert said.

According to the expert, after this the plane began to fall at a vertical speed of 10 - 11 thousand feet per minute (3 thousand meters), the angle of incidence before the crash was 35 - 45 degrees.

Soon the commander returned to the cockpit, but his presence did not change anything. The crew, according to Bouillard, until the moment of the crash did not pay attention to either the aircraft stall signal, which worked intermittently, or the corresponding shaking.

“The acceleration bar was exceeded, the plane went beyond the operational limits. The ship could have been returned to operational limits by lowering the control stick, but it remained in the climb position, which only aggravated the situation,” Bouillard noted.

According to him, the pilots completely lost control of the situation.

“At this stage, only an extremely determined and well-aware crew could return the aircraft to operational mode,” the expert said.

However, the head of the BEA Troadek noted that the Bureau does not establish the legal responsibility of those responsible for the crash of the airliner, which became the largest air disaster in the history of Air France. The perpetrators will be determined by the court, which is conducting its own investigation. On Wednesday, excerpts from a forensic report were released, which noted the loss of data due to frostbite in the Pitot sensors and the lack of response from the crew.

The French Air Accident Investigation Bureau has put an end to the history of one of the most. A report has been released on the causes of the crash of an Air France airbus over the Atlantic. On July 1, 2009, en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, an A-330 crashed into the ocean, killing 228 people.

The investigation into the tragedy was complicated by the fact that the wreckage of the liner went to great depths. The flight recorders were discovered only after the disaster itself. Having deciphered them, experts shared preliminary conclusions: part of the blame was placed on the pilots who failed to adequately respond to equipment failure. Whether this version was confirmed in the final analysis will be reported from Paris NTV columnist Vadim Glusker.

In this plane crash, both turbulence and the lack of visual references played a fatal role, but most importantly, icing of the sensors of the air parameters system.

Alain Bouillard, head of the investigation: “The reason for the plane stall was the lack of control of the flight path in conditions of lack of information about altitude and speed. Ice crystals clogged the channels of the air pressure sensors, the so-called pitot tubes.”

But the experts' main complaint is against the crew itself. The report explicitly states that the pilots' actions during the emergency were erroneous.

The investigation showed that three hours after takeoff, the crew commander woke up the co-pilot and told him that he would go to sleep. Ten minutes later, the co-pilot announced to the crew that the plane was entering a zone of turbulence, and the pilots decided to transfer the plane to manual control mode. After two minutes, the sensors begin to show mutually exclusive speed indicators. The co-pilot is still trying to wake up the crew commander, who will eventually return to the cockpit. Then an alarm about loss of speed will be sent. At 2:12 the latest decryption data and the commander’s cry: “We don’t have any indicators, we can’t trust the instruments!”

Alain Bouillard: “Based on the aerodynamic noise and shaking, the pilot decided that the aircraft's speed must be too high. Despite the fact that the stall indicator went off repeatedly, the crew never realized that the stall had begun and the plane was plummeting."

In addition, experts found that the ship's commander did not just sleep during the emergency and refused to return when the co-pilot persistently called him: he spent time with the flight attendant. Be that as it may, the technical investigation into the plane crash has been completed. Now forensic investigators will deal with the last flight of the Airbus A-330.