MOSCOW, June 19. /ITAR-TASS/. Russia proceeds from the fact that Ukraine has committed itself to demarcating the border within the framework of the existing bilateral agreement, and unilateral steps will not be legally binding for Moscow. This was stated by official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry Alexander Lukashevich. According to him, Russia expects Ukraine to abandon unilateral border demarcation.
“This topic is actively circulating in the media, according to established international practice, state border demarcation is a mutual process between neighboring states, therefore unilateral demarcation cannot be legally binding for the other side,” Lukashevich noted. “In accordance with the bilateral agreement with Ukraine dated May 17, 2010 "a joint demarcation commission was established." “This also fits into the norms and principles that states should follow when carrying out demarcation work,” the diplomat said. “We proceed from the fact that Ukraine has assumed obligations to carry out demarcation within the framework of this mechanism.”
The Russian part of the commission “has always demonstrated a readiness for dialogue and teamwork; members of the commission traveled to Kyiv.” “But, unfortunately, it was not possible to hold full-fledged negotiations due to the fault of the Ukrainian side,” Lukashevich added. “We hope that the Ukrainian authorities will refuse to take practical steps to unilaterally demarcate the border in violation of existing international obligations,” emphasized the representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry.
According to the Federal Agency for the Development of the State Border of the Russian Federation, the delimitation of the land state border between Russia and Ukraine has been completed.
On April 23, 2004, the State Border Treaty between Russia and Ukraine came into force. The appendices to the Treaty include a description of the Russian-Ukrainian state border and an album of maps at a scale of 1:50,000 with a marked border line. The agreement did not provide for demarcation. In accordance with the Russia-Ukraine Action Plan approved by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, preparatory work was carried out to demarcate the state border until 2009. Based on the Russian-Ukrainian Agreement on cooperation in the use Sea of Azov And Kerch Strait, which came into force on April 23, 2004, negotiations were also held on delimitation in the Sea of Azov. On May 17, 2010, an Agreement was signed between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the demarcation of the Russian-Ukrainian state border. Russia has completed all internal state procedures necessary for this document to enter into force.
Continuation
Border Initiatives
On June 16, the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) of Ukraine instructed the government to carry out unilateral demarcation of the Ukrainian-Russian state border. This was stated by NSDC Secretary Andriy Parubiy after a Security Council meeting chaired by President Petro Poroshenko.
On June 17, the Verkhovna Rada, when voting again, recommended that the Ukrainian government, within a month, “make a decision to suspend the operation of checkpoints across the state border along the land section with Russia.” This draft resolution was approved by 261 deputies, with the minimum required 226. The Ukrainian parliament also recommended that the government “immediately approve the documents necessary for carrying out the unilaterally demarcation of the land section of the border with the Russian Federation, which will be arranged following the example of the external borders of the European Union."
The Cabinet of Ministers was also given a recommendation to immediately suspend the operation of checkpoints and strengthen control on the border with Moldova “in areas neighboring Transnistrian Republic"In addition, parliamentarians decided to allocate the necessary funds for the improvement of the land state border with Russia and to increase the staff of the State Border Service.
The Russian-Chinese border is more than 130 years old. It was in 1860, when the Treaty of Beijing was signed, that Governor Eastern Siberia Muravyov-Amursky, together with the Chinese side, recorded that from now on this is the border of two great empires. From now on and forever. That’s exactly what the diplomats wrote down – “forever”.However, what was done “forever” in the 19th century, then in our days it was decided to review it. At the same time, reconsider in favor of the Chinese side. Work has actually already been carried out to consolidate the transfer of 960 hectares of Russian territory in the Ussuri region on the site of the so-called letter P. It is planned to soon move the border in the area of Lake Khasan. Move it so that Russia will lose another three hundred hectares of its previously considered “eternal” territories here. Why else?
This is how Russian and Chinese diplomats first defined the border in the Agreement on the demarcation of the Eastern section of the Soviet-Chinese border of May 16, 1991. Russia must transfer more than 1000 hectares of its territories to China.
In general, “demarcation” is nothing more than a clarification of boundaries where they have already been established in connection with changes in the soil, river beds, and so on that have occurred over the course of a number of years. In this case, demarcation refers to the revision and revision of an existing border. There is about a month left before the completion of this work on the almost 4,000-kilometer Russian-Chinese border. Such deadlines are provided for in the Russian-Chinese Agreement.
I’ll say right away that the demarcation work on our border was indeed caused by a certain necessity. For example, the same Tumannaya River, along the watershed of which part of the Russian-Chinese border passed, has changed its course over 130 years and has now crawled into Russia. In other cases, the corresponding border markers installed by both the Chinese and Russian sides were not always accurately documented.
Therefore, one could say that during the demarcation some areas up to several meters wide will be revised. After all, I repeat once again, the border in its main parameters was established for centuries back in the 19th century.
But when preparing and signing the Agreement in May 1991, Russian diplomats for some reason ceded not meters, which would be understandable from the point of view of pure border demarcation, but hundreds of hectares of Russian territories. Unfortunately, the same point of view prevailed later during the work on the ground. However, not all Russian specialists decided to meekly support the already signed Agreement. Thus, the adviser to the demarcation commission, Major General Valery Rozov, resigned in April 1996 in protest against this decision. The Russian hereditary border guard (third generation) did not want to go down in Russian history, as he himself says, “a traitor to the interests of the Russian State.”
What is really happening today on the Russian-Chinese border. Both the Chinese and Russian sides are showing particular interest, first of all, in moving the border near the Tumannaya River, where, in accordance with the Agreement, two sections should be transferred to China with total area more than 300 hectares of primordially Russian territories.
The transfer of these areas disrupts the established balance of economic and political forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Because it is precisely these two areas, which are still within Russian borders, that will not allow China to build here major port. The territory for the port itself is wedged into the junction of the borders of three states: Russia, Korea and China. The creation of a port today is hampered by one thing - the lack of territory for the construction of access roads to it. The site for the construction of the port is located on the territory of China, but those areas through which roads and railways can be laid are on the territory of Russia. With the transfer of two Russian-owned sites on the banks of the Tumannaya River to China, the last obstacle to the creation of a powerful port facility here is removed.
Meanwhile, the Agreement not only establishes historical territories Russia follows China, but also unilaterally grants China the right of navigation along the Tumannaya River (Tumenjiang) below the thirty-third border point to the Sea of Japan and back.
This was how China's access to the Sea of Japan was legally secured along the 17 kilometers of the Tumannaya River remaining from the site of the proposed port construction, which is the border between Russia and North Korea.
- The estimated cargo turnover of the port is 100 million tons per year. Thus China gets:
- firstly, access to the Sea of Japan with the subsequent development of trade sea routes to the USA, Japan, Singapore, etc.;
cargo from the Asia-Pacific region will flow not through the ports of Vladivostok and Nakhodka along the Russian BAM, but through the port of Tumandzyan along the Chinese Eastern Railway. This route is almost 2000 km shorter than the Russian one, and therefore, naturally, more attractive for business. For the Russian side, this means that the ports operating in Primorye, and after them the BAM, will die, and the Chinese ones will flourish.
And such an opportunity, i.e. the revision of agreements already reached is provided for by the Agreement itself, which states that during the work of the joint Russian-Chinese commission on border demarcation, all controversial issues will be resolved. In those areas that are mentioned here, unfortunately, boundaries have already been defined that infringe on the interests of Russia. This, I am convinced, must be decisively stopped.
The inheritance that we inherited from our ancestors - and this is, first of all, the territory of our Motherland, the territory of Russia - must be passed on to our descendants in the same unchanged form.
Nazdratenko guards the Sea of Japan from the Chinese
The dispute over the demarcation of the eastern section of the Russian-Chinese border was started by the leadership of the Primorsky Territory in 1995. The Governor of Primorye, Yevgeny Nazdratenko, then publicly rejected the proposals of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the joint economic use of a number of sections of the territory of Russia and China, extending to the adjacent side as a result of the demarcation of the state border. Thus, he marked the beginning of a long-term conflict, which by all indications can be considered both an international scandal and an internal showdown between the center and the subject of the federation.
Since the conflict was brought to the attention of the public, the arguments of the parties have undergone certain changes (especially on the part of the governor). But one way or another, against the backdrop of the current visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Moscow and the epoch-making agreements “on a multipolar world and the formation of a new international order,” the issue of territorial disagreements, the existence of which Governor Nazdratenko insists, could introduce serious dissonance into the optimistic picture of Russian-Chinese cooperation.
Background
Border disputes between the two countries have a long history. According to the Tianjin Treaty of June 1, 1858, it was envisaged that a line would be drawn across lands that had previously been under joint management. On November 2, 1860, in Beijing, General Nikolai Ignatiev signed an additional treaty on the eastern border between the empires. The parties agreed that “after the establishment of boundary markers, the boundary line should not be changed forever.” This condition was observed for 131 years. Then the “territory problem” arose. On May 16, 1991, the USSR and the PRC signed an agreement on the state border in its eastern part, agreeing to clarify its line in order to “fairly and rationally resolve the remaining border issues.”
Actually, the demarcation of the eastern part of the border between Russia and China was really necessary - in fact, it was undeveloped. If in most regions demarcation work is carried out once every 10-15 years, then in the East it was last carried out in the 19th century. Today, when border areas are open to economic use, cases of unintentional border violations have become more frequent: in places where there are not enough border signs, Russians accidentally wander into China, and the Chinese come to us.
However, the leadership of the Primorsky Territory is confident that the border was clarified unfairly and irrationally. In 1993, the administration drew the attention of the regional council to the fact that, according to the agreement, more than 1,500 hectares in the Primorsky Territory would go to China (the Khabarovsk Territory and the Amur Region also lost parts of their lands). In the Khankaisky district, 300 hectares of arable land are transferred, in the Ussuriysky district - 960 hectares of cedar forests, in the Khasansky district - 330 hectares adjacent to the Tumannaya River (now the demarcation remains to be completed only in the last section). In this regard, Yevgeny Nazdratenko, threatening his resignation, said that he would not allow “not an inch of land” to be transferred to the Chinese.
Since then, the governor's position has undergone metamorphoses more than once in accordance with the political situation. The demand to completely denounce the agreement between Russia and the PRC (while Nazdratenko claimed that he relied on Yeltsin’s personal support) was replaced by recognition of the Vienna Convention, which does not allow the denunciation of international agreements in principle. Nevertheless, from the story of the demarcation, Nazdratenko earned a lasting reputation as a patriot, which was useful to him both in the elections and in the fight against the center.
For the last time, the head of the administration abandoned his previous jingoistic rhetoric, specifying his position on the negative consequences of demarcation in its previous form. Firstly, he claims, having received a piece of territory at the mouth of the Tumannaya River, the Chinese will build a large port there. China's access to the Sea of Japan will open the way for Chinese raw materials and goods to Japan. Secondly, new port will sharply reduce the attractiveness of the ports of Primorye, and cargo turnover on the Trans-Siberian Railway will be reduced by half.
One of the latest documents from the regional administration on demarcation states that “Russia’s readiness to make unilateral concessions to China creates a precedent for hardening Japan’s position on seizing the four South Kuril Islands and intensifying territorial claims on the part of neighboring states in the west and south of Russia” (a direct reference to the problem Sevastopol). Armed with these arguments, the governor turned to the Federation Council for support, but received no results. But he came across a menacing shout from Boris Yeltsin, who demanded that Nazdratenko henceforth coordinate his statements on Russian-Chinese relations with the Foreign Ministry. But the head of Primorye remained unconvinced. True, it acts more subtly.
An urgent collection of signatures for holding a regional referendum has begun in Primorye, during which local residents will speak out for or against the transfer of land. As a member of the initiative group told reporters social movement The “Party of Primorye”, prosecutor of the Leninsky district of Vladivostok Oleg Logunov, has nothing to do with the regional authorities, but Nazdratenko’s point of view on the problem of demarcation and relations with China is fully shared. Both the functionaries of the Primorye Party and the regional administration are diligently distancing themselves, cultivating the image of a social-patriotic initiative that came from the very thick of the masses. Although the allegations that the administration and the Primorye Party are not coordinating their actions raise serious doubts.
Despite the presidential demand, the restless governor continues to pursue his own foreign policy line. Recently, at a meeting with journalists in Vladivostok, Nazdratenko once again confirmed his point of view on demarcation. “The transfer of a strategically important section of the border in the Khasan region to the PRC means the subsequent death of the ports of Primorye, and in the near future, the loss of Russia’s position in the Far East.”
Dissent in the seaside way: pacta sunt servanda
The Russian Foreign Ministry has so far limited itself to brief negative assessments of Nazdratenko’s position. However, in reality, the arguments of the Primorye leadership are quite serious and require more detailed consideration.
Of course, not all researchers in Primorye agree with the position of the regional leadership. For example, Doctor of Law, Professor of the Department of International Law of the Far Eastern State University Valentin Mikhailov, who expressed his opinion on the pages of the Vladivostok newspaper.
The professor notes that last half century, especially after Nikita Khrushchev fell out with Mao Zedong, China made serious territorial claims to the USSR, claiming vast territories: Primorye, Amur region, south Khabarovsk Territory, part of Transbaikalia (at one time there was talk of as much as one and a half million square kilometers that Russia allegedly seized from China). Guided by the decision of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR government instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to begin negotiations with China on the territorial issue. These extremely difficult negotiations lasted more than 30 years and ended in early 1991. Diplomats managed to defend Russian lands and reject Chinese territorial claims, with the exception of some small sections of the border.
The ratification of the treaty prepared in Soviet times was carried out by the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. If the deputies had refused ratification, they would have had to reconsider China's demands for the transfer of all of Primorye and other territories to it. “All the work of our diplomats would go down the drain, relations with China would again go to the brink of war, as was the case in 1969 on Damansky Island,” says Professor Mikhailov.
He also sees many shortcomings in the demarcation agreement. But the following point is indisputable, according to the international lawyer: signed agreements must be respected regardless of changes in the international situation, regardless of any domestic events. All international law and interstate relations are based on the principle of pacta sunt servanda (“treaties must be respected”).
By the way, if the Russian-Chinese demarcation agreement were denounced by Russia unilaterally, in this case, Mr. Mikhailov believes, the border agreement with China, signed back in 1860 in Beijing, would remain in force. It was this agreement that led to the border dispute between the USSR and the PRC, since China interprets many of its provisions in a very unique way. At the same time, the Chinese could well take a retaliatory measure by unilaterally denouncing the treaty of 1860. In this case, the Russian-Chinese treaty of 1858 would remain in force, according to which the entire current Primorsky Territory and the southern part of Khabarovsk are under the joint jurisdiction of China and Russia. It turns out that Beijing could send its governor to Vladivostok, who would govern Primorye together with Nazdratenko.
By the way, as one of the possible solutions, the administration of Primorye proposes to “demarcate the Russian-Chinese border in the area between 416 and 419 (see diagram - Kommersant) with border markers in strict accordance with the Beijing Treaty of 1860, the protocol on the exchange of maps and descriptions demarcation in the Ussuri region (06/16/1861), a protocol on a carefully checked section of the border between two states (06/26/1886) and the conclusion of the interdepartmental commission on the unilateral verification of the Soviet-Chinese border (09/16/1986)."
As for the thesis that the PRC will allegedly gain access to Sea of Japan, then such a statement, according to legal scholars, is not based on anything. The treaty under consideration does not provide for the transfer of Russian territory adjacent to the Sea of Japan to China. Those areas that are supposed to be transferred to China are located far from the sea. And even if the PRC begins to develop them (to deepen the bed of the Tumannaya River, according to the regional administration, with the help of a million Chinese), this will not cause any legal consequences: the Chinese will not receive access to the sea at Russia’s expense.
According to international law, even if the direction of the flow of the Tumannaya River changes due to natural causes or as a result of human influence, the border line will remain in the same place where it was before this event, unless Russia and China agree to change it.
The assertion that the ports of Primorye will suffer from competition with the mythical Chinese port on the Tumannaya River is also controversial. Moreover, in condition sea gate The Far East is already being seriously affected by domestic Russian economic conditions.
Even a superficial analysis of data on cargo handling by the region’s ports in 1995-1996 confirms that the ports owe their current comparative well-being compared to local enterprises primarily to Russian exporters. They mainly provide cargo, and therefore work, to almost the entire port system of Primorye. And if Yakut coal miners, Siberian metallurgists or oil workers reduce the export of their products, then cargo turnover at the largest Far Eastern ports will fall catastrophically, and some will even be left without work.
Chinese threat: myths and reality
However, a border dispute could provoke negative consequences for Russian-Chinese relations much earlier than the Chinese build a competing port.
The main danger is the aggravation of interethnic relations associated with the introduction of the myth of the “Chinese threat” into the public consciousness. Shortly before Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow, a number of Chinese publications told readers about the anti-Chinese sentiment prevailing in Siberia and the Far East, accusing local politicians of deliberately and hysterically inflating the myth of “creeping Chinese expansion.”
Is there any reason to say that in the near future “Vladivostok will become a suburb of Harbin”? According to Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Director of the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences Viktor Larin, the scale of Chinese expansion in Far East, which is predominantly economic, “shuttle” in nature, are noticeably exaggerated. The population is intimidated by the huge number of Chinese who have already infiltrated and intend to infiltrate Russia, although the real numbers of illegal migration are much more modest. According to the professor, the “Chinese arrival” does not pose a threat to Russia - such a threat exists only in our imagination. The same applies to military security.
But today it can be stated that the federal authorities are practically unable to “put in their place” the head of a federal subject who openly interferes with the implementation of the interstate agreement on border demarcation, and in fact carries out its own foreign policy on behalf of Russia. But it seems that in the conditions of the fuel and energy complex crisis, against the background of endless squabbles of local authorities and total non-payment of salaries to public sector employees, the pose of a patriot remains the last trump card of Evgeniy Nazdratenko.
| 02.04.2011 | 10:58
Why the issue of demarcation of the Russian-Abkhaz border has attracted close attention of the public, what “disputed” territory the diplomats of the two countries are talking about, a senior researcher at the Center for Caucasus Problems and Regional Security at MGIMO (U) of the Russian Foreign Ministry told Rosbalt Vadim Mukhanov.
- Vadim Mikhailovich, is there some kind of territorial dispute between Russia and Abkhazia?
I would not evaluate this as a dispute, because there is no dispute as such yet. Information that is available to the general public concerns bilateral negotiations. Namely: in recent days, negotiations have been held between the official delegations of Abkhazia and Russia regarding the demarcation and clarification of the border between the two states.
At the same time, information has appeared and is being circulated that Russia is laying claim to a territory of 160 square meters. km. But so far neither I nor my fellow experts have heard an official statement regarding Russia’s claims to this territory. Most likely, we are talking about clarifying the boundaries. This is due to the fact that the border line has changed periodically in history. Both Russian diplomats and Russian and Abkhaz experts pay attention to this.
- Where does the history of the issue come from?
The question of the ownership of the border territories, in the current Gagrinsky district, arose back in the 19th century within the framework of the Caucasian governorship - when there were no such entities as Russian Federation and Abkhazia.
Administrative-territorial units were created as part of the Caucasian governorship. One of them was the Black Sea province, which appeared as a result of the Caucasian War. It included the territory where the Circassians lived. Another administrative unit became the territory of the Abkhaz principality, which then changed into the Sukhumi military department, and then into the district.
In the 20th century, Abkhazia arose within the Sukhumi district, the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic. But the border between the Black Sea province and the Sukhumi district in the previous century was not the same as it is now.
In 1904, the Gagrinsky district from the Sukhumi district was transferred to the neighboring Black Sea province. The purpose of the transfer is to promote the colonization of the Black Sea coast, which became quite deserted after the departure of thousands of mountaineers to Turkey as part of the Muhajir movement. It was believed that the Gagrinsky district would be better off within the Black Sea province, which was developing more intensively. At that time, there was a climate station in Gagra, which was supervised by the Prince of Oldenburg, who allocated a lot of money there. In general, this transfer of territory was logical.
And it is precisely such stories that are now being referred to by people who are promoting the issue of ownership of the Gagrinsky district.
- When was the border drawn along the Psou River?
As part of the “parade of sovereignties” during civil war in 1918, de facto independent state entities began to appear in the Caucasus. The Mountain Republic, Abkhazia, Georgian Democratic Republic, etc. appeared. The question of the line that could separate the territory of Kuban from Georgian or Abkhazian territory has repeatedly come up. As part of this “discourse,” many experts recall the famous Sochi incident, or conflict.
Then Denikin's Volunteer Army took control Black Sea coast and “stumbled” into Georgian troops in the Tuapse area. Negotiations took place between Denikin and official representatives of the Georgian Republic. The Georgian delegation was headed by Yevgeny Gegechkori, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs of the first republic of Georgia. Then the Georgians insisted that the border between the territory of the collected Russia and Georgia (which controlled Abkhazia) should pass through the Sochi district. That is, they also attributed Gagra to themselves.
This caused great controversy, there was an armed conflict, as a result of which the Georgian armed forces and the People's Guards were driven across the Psou River. This border along the Psou River, in general, remains as a result of that clash between the Volunteer Army and Georgian troops.
Then this border was fixed in those agreements that emerged following the results of the civil war and the emergence of the Soviet Union.
- What is the reason for the attention to the issue of drawing the border these days?
I repeat that there is no official dispute yet; negotiations are underway to clarify the border. Everything is clear and clear with the attitude of Russian diplomats. We are talking not only about Psou and clarifying the affiliation of certain villages, but also about the most important issue - the safety of future Olympic Games, because Krasnaya Polyana is just a stone's throw from Psou.
As part of resolving this security issue, it is important to clarify who will control the crossings across this river, under whose protection the villages on both sides will be, etc. In particular, we can talk about the village, which is located on both sides of Psou. This is the village of Aibga. It is very sparsely populated - there are just over 100 inhabitants. According to Abkhaz experts, there is an old road there that leads in the Sochi direction, towards Krasnaya Polyana.
Many Russian experts propose to raise various archival documents devoted to the administrative-territorial division in the Russian Empire. Yes, it would be interesting, but it seems to me that it would be much more productive to discuss not how the administrative line changed in the 19th or 20th centuries, but the urgent needs of the parties that exist now, at the beginning of the 21st century.
It would be unnecessary to remind that Russian-Abkhaz relations are quite strong, the political leadership of Abkhazia is focused on Russia, and we are strategic partners. It seems to me that the resonant circles around these negotiations are largely being promoted and inflated by those forces that want to drive a wedge into bilateral relations. So far there are no official complaints from either side. We can only talk about those rumors that are being circulated in the public consciousness of both Abkhazia and Russian society.
- Why such increased attention to Russian-Abkhaz relations?
It is no secret with what jealousy these relations are viewed from the capital of one neighboring Transcaucasian republic. This is the first thing. And secondly, in Lately Issues have arisen that require immediate resolution. For example, a Russian-Abkhaz commission is currently working to establish ownership rights to real estate in Abkhazia. And there are more and more such moments that require early bilateral discussion. But this does not mean that you should quickly draw a conclusion about a sharp deterioration in relations, as some colleagues allow themselves. This is clearly premature.
All these are current moments within the framework of full recognition of Abkhazia. It is one thing to sign a document of recognition, and another thing to then “hang” the legislative, documentary basis. These are issues related to the border, financial assistance, the location of military bases, etc. This is a very long process. It is now moving in a fairly calm direction, and there is no heated or angry dispute that some people are trying to talk about. I think that some politicians in Abkhazia are simply trying to make some dividends from this.
We must wait for the results of all negotiations and the announcement of the official positions of both Sukhum and Moscow. Then it will be possible to calmly assess the prospects of these negotiations. So far, most of the comments are based solely on rumors.
